University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2019

The Invention of First Amendment Federalism
Jud Campbell
University of Richmond - School of Law, jcampbe4@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 517 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

CAMPBELL.P RINTING (DO NOT DELETE)

2/14/2019 11:28 PM

The Invention of First Amendment
Federalism
Jud Campbell*

When insisting that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First Amendment,
Jeffersonian Republicans cast their argument in historical terms, claiming that
the Speech and Press Clauses eliminated any federal power to restrict
expression. Scholars, in turn, have generally accepted that Republicans had a
consistent understanding of the First Amendment throughout the 1790s. But
Founding Era constitutionalism was dynamic in practice, even while often
conservative in rhetoric, and scholars have missed the striking novelty of the
principal argument against the Sedition Act. Republicans had taken a rights
provision and transformed it into a federalism rule.
Mostly ignored in the literature, and never analyzed as a central feature of
the opposition to the Sedition Act, the problem of partisan jury selection drove
the shift in Republican thought. As originally understood, speech and press
freedoms put juries primarily in charge of administering governmental
limitations of expression. Following the development of political parties,
however, Republicans perceived that the guarantee of a jury trial was nearly
meaningless when federal jurors were hand selected by partisan federal
marshals. In response, Republicans promoted a new reading of the First
Amendment. Deeply suspicious of abuse by federal judges and juries,
Republicans insisted that the First Amendment deprived the federal government
of any authority to regulate speech or the press, even though analogous speech
and press clauses at the state level left considerable room for states to regulate
harmful expression.
This episode reveals a latent tension in eighteenth-century
constitutionalism. Some threads of Founding Era thought embraced the notion
of a document with fixed meaning, but other features encouraged constitutional
evolution as conditions changed. Rather than seeking a principled resolution of
this tension, however, Republicans developed entirely new arguments and then
cast them in historical terms. The invention of First Amendment federalism also
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raises the possibility of a different path for modern speech doctrine, guided less
by a particular theory of why speech is special and more by practical concerns
about political entrenchment and politically biased enforcement.
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Introduction
In May 1797, with partisan tempers flaring, a Federalist-dominated
federal grand jury in Richmond presented “as a real evil the circular Letters
of several members of the late Congress, and particularly Letters with the
Signature of [Virginia Republican] Samuel J. Cabell.”1 Coming a year before
the infamous Sedition Act of 1798, the presentment unleashed a torrent of
criticism and catalyzed Republican thought on speech and press freedoms.
Crucially, it taught Republicans that they could no longer rely on juries as the
great “palladium of liberty.” 2 As the Virginia House of Delegates explained
that winter, juries had become a tool for the “subjection of the natural right
of speaking and writing freely, to the censure and controul of Executive
power.”3 Republicans, in response, developed a new conception of the

1. Presentment of the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia (May 22, 1797)
[hereinafter Presentment of the Grand Jury], in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, at 181, 181 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1990).
2. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350 (“[T]he liberties of England
cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate . . . .”); A NATIVE OF
VIRGINIA, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PROPOSED P LAN OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1788)
(asserting that in prosecutions of “a bold writer, or any other person, who had become obnoxious to
[the government,] . . . the trial by jury may well be called the palladium of liberty”), reprinted in 9
THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 655, 686 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990).
3. Resolution of the Virginia House of Delegates, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER
(Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at 2.
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Speech and Press Clauses, arguing that the First Amendment removed all
federal authority over expression, even though state speech and press
guarantees left ample room for state-level regulations of harmful speech.
The basic problem, as Republican congressional leader Albert Gallatin
explained during the Sedition Act debates, was jury selection. The Judiciary
Act, it turns out, put federal marshals in charge of hand selecting federal
jurors in many mid-Atlantic and Southern states. Back in 1789, executive
control over juror selection enhanced rights, helping to ensure that creditors
received fairer treatment in federal courts than in state courts dominated by
parochial juries. But following the emergence of political parties in the
1790s, the selection of jurors by a federal marshal—a “creature of the
Executive,” as Gallatin put it—raised grave problems in politically charged
cases.4 “[W]hen the supposed crimes to be punished were a libel against the
Administration,” Gallatin asked rhetorically, “what security of a fair trial
remained to a citizen, when the jury was liable to be packed by the
Administration, when the same men were to be judges and parties?”5
Mostly ignored by scholars, and never analyzed as a central feature of
Republican thought, 6 the problem of partisan jury selection lay at the heart of
opposition to the Sedition Act and powerfully shaped Republican strategy
and rhetoric about speech and press freedoms. Republicans widely
acknowledged that libelous speech ought to be proscribed, and many agreed
that seditious speech should be criminally punished. But critics of the
government, Congressman Edward Livingston explained, would much

4. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2164 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
5. Id.
6. Many scholars have pointed out Republican complaints about jury selection, usually once
sedition prosecutions were underway, but these scholars have not explored how fears of partisan
juries shaped Republican thought about speech and press freedoms in the first place. E.g., 3 ALBERT
J. BEVERIDGE, THE L IFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 42–43 (1919); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 78 (1920); MICHAEL KENT C URTIS, FREE SPEECH, “T HE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 67–68 (2000);
PETER C HARLES HOFFER, THE FREE PRESS CRISIS OF 1800: THOMAS COOPER’S TRIAL FOR
SEDITIOUS L IBEL 47–48 (2011); Frank Maloy Anderson, The Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition
Laws, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN H ISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1912, at
115, 125–26 (1914); Juror Reform Bills of 1800, in 4 T HE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, at 270, 270 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992);
Kathryn Preyer, United States v. Callender: Judge and Jury in a Republican Society, in ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 173, 182–83 (Maeva Marcus
ed., 1992); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Story of the Sedition Act of 1798: “The Reign of Witches”, in
FIRST AMENDMENT S TORIES 13, 20 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
Richard Buel Jr. observes that lessened confidence in juries reinforced longstanding Republican
opposition to proscribing political opinions, RICHARD BUEL JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION:
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1789-1815, at 251–52 (1972), and Adrienne Koch and Harry
Ammon note that Jefferson’s effort to reform jury selection was an aspect “of one campaign to
defend civil liberties,” Adrienne Koch & Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions:
An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 145, 153
(1948), but these works do not account for the Republicans’ innovative theory of the First
Amendment.

CAMPBELL.P RINTING (DO NOT DELETE)

520

2/14/2019 11:28 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:517

likelier “receive an impartial trial” in a state tribunal, without “a jury selected
by an officer holding his office at the will of the President.”7 With Federalists
running all three branches of the national government, Republicans skeptical
about the administration of speech-suppressing laws channeled their thinking
toward an innovative reading of the First Amendment.
The Republican account of the First Amendment departed substantially
from prevailing ideas about speech and press freedoms. 8 In the late eighteenth
century, American elites generally understood the freedom of speech as a
natural right, qualified in its scope and without concrete legal effect. This
principle essentially meant that the government could regulate expression
only pursuant to law and only in promotion of the public good, as determined
in good faith by the people and their representatives. For many, the freedom
of speech also imposed a more categorical limit on governmental power,
barring punishment of well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts but
leaving the government free to punish efforts to deceive others. The freedom
of the press was multifaceted, too, providing both a broad requirement that
the government restrict publishing only in the public interest and a narrower
categorical ban on licensing rules that imposed “prior restraints” on printers.
The latter of these effectively ensured that juries stood between the
government and any restrictions on the press.
By the late 1790s, after national political parties had developed, these
conventional speech and press freedoms offered little solace to Republicans.
The guarantee of a jury trial was nearly meaningless if jurors were hand
selected by federal marshals, whose search for jurors of sound judgment
would naturally lead them to people with similar political views. And once
the jury was stacked, substantive protections would be worthless, too.
Partisan juries, they perceived, would tend to view invectives against the
Adams Administration as breaching the Sedition Act’s prohibition of “false,

7. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2153 (1798) (statement of Rep. Edward Livingston).
8. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 312 (2017)
(“This view became prominent only later in the 1790s, when Republicans realized that Federalist
control of all three branches of the federal government, combined with the administration’s ability
to choose jurors, threatened their political survival.”). For more on speech and press freedoms from
the Founding Era to the Sedition Act, see generally P HILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE E ARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: T HE F IRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY
OF ENGLISH L AW (2010); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); David A.
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); David. S. Bogen, The
Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429 (1983); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993); William T. Mayton,
Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984);
and David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early
American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985). For a closer look at non-elite attitudes, see Saul
Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual
History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 748–54 (2013) and Saul Cornell,
The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 326–34 (2011).
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scandalous and malicious” writings—a narrowly drawn legal rule that
comported with prevailing law. Strongly suspicious of abuse by federal
judges and juries, Republicans insisted that the First Amendment
categorically deprived the federal government of any authority to regulate
speech or the press.
Scholars tend to treat Republican views about the federal Speech and
Press Clauses as mostly static, making the fight over the Sedition Act an
opportunity for the Founding generation to hash out a constitutional
disagreement that had been lurking throughout the 1790s. 9 On this view, the
election of 1800 was pivotal in fixing the role of speech and press freedoms
in American democracy. “In their first opportunity to weigh in on the matter,”
Akhil Amar writes, “American voters sided with [James] Madison, vaulting
his mentor and fellow free-speech champion Thomas Jefferson into the
executive mansion and sweeping the Jefferson-Madison party into
congressional power.”10 Importantly, this conventional account lends an air
of originalist support for our more libertarian approach to modern First
Amendment law.
There are some grains of truth to this story of historical continuity.
Republicans and Federalists frequently clashed in the 1790s over the role of
popular participation in politics, 11 and this conflict occasionally led to
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
815, 837 (“The abstract language of the First Amendment left unresolved differing views about the
meaning of freedom of speech and press; these disputes would break out into the open later on in
the 1790s . . . .”); James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 121
(1999) (“[T]he Sedition Act was really a ‘last hurrah’ and pyrrhic victory in a conflict between a
fading ‘republican’ and still emerging ‘liberal’ understanding of representation and the political and
social order.”). For portrayals of Republican views as consistent over the 1790s, see, for example,
Anderson, supra note 8, at 529–33; Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment:
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1567–
71 (1995); and Mayton, supra note 8, at 117–21. When scholars have drawn on the dynamism of
the period, it is often to emphasize a putative shift in views among Federalists. E.g., Anderson,
supra note 8, at 519–20. Leonard Levy, it is worth noting, famously argued that Republican views
substantially evolved in the 1790s. But where Levy perceived continuity in an understanding of the
First Amendment as a categorical bar on federal regulations of expression, LEVY, supra note 8, at
323, and novelty in Madison’s more liberal understanding of speech and press freedoms, id. at 320–
25, my view is the opposite. Nobody at the Founding argued that the First Amendment would have
a different effect than state speech and press freedoms, but other arguments against the Sedition Act
were not—as David Rabban rightly points out—“a sudden breakthrough in libertarian thought.”
Rabban, supra note 8, at 852.
10. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: T HE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE L IVE BY 169 (2012). For those keeping score, Americans’ first electoral
opportunity to weigh in on the Sedition Act was the election of 1798—a tidal wave Federalist
victory. In another work, Amar wrote that “a popular majority adjudicated the First Amendment
question in the election of 1800, by throwing out the haughty and aristocratic rascals who had tried
to shield themselves from popular criticism.” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF R IGHTS : CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 23 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS ]. The Sedition Act, he
emphasized, was a “betrayal of the original Bill of Rights.” Id. at 305.
11. See COLLEEN A. S HEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN SELF-
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disputes over speech and press freedoms. 12 Not every rejoinder to the
Sedition Act was novel. But the dominant Republican argument was a
substantial departure from earlier views. When it came to interpreting the
First Amendment, the only consensus position among Republicans in the late
1790s was that federal protections, unlike state-level guarantees,
categorically barred any regulation of expression. 13 At the heart of their
campaign against the Sedition Act, Republicans were recasting the First
Amendment as a rule about the allocation of power between the federal and
state governments, not as a guarantee of rights.14
The Republican invention of First Amendment federalism highlights
latent tensions in American constitutionalism at the Founding. On the one
hand, dynamism and creativity thrived. Partisan political objectives were
certainly one catalyst for constitutional change, but there were other
contributors too. From an experiential standpoint, Americans were born and
bred in the evolutionary culture of English customary constitutionalism,
where time and again new constitutional principles had emerged from
prominent public controversies. This experience made it second nature for
the Founders to argue for new constitutional rules. 15 And from a more
philosophical bent, elites still embraced flexible interpretive principles
derived from social-contract theory, like the idea that constitutions should be
construed to promote the public good.
At the same time, however, Americans were beginning to think about
and describe their constitution in conservative—even static—terms. To be
sure, this phenomenon was not entirely new. English constitutional rhetoric
GOVERNMENT 54 (2009) (describing the conflict between James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
as being “propelled by a fundamental philosophic disagreement over the nature and role of public
opinion in a republic”). See generally JAMES ROGER S HARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC : THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS (1993) (providing an overview of political conflict in the
1790s).
12. See BUEL, supra note 6, at 91–136 (highlighting disagreements over the role of public
opinion in various conflicts throughout the 1790s).
13. See Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal,
1970 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 129–35 (discussing the Republican opposition to the Sedition Act and
simultaneous acceptance of analogous state laws). For a brief summary of Jefferson’s views, see
Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 694–99 (1998).
14. Although limiting powers was sometimes a means for protecting liberty, the Founding
generation did not equate “retaining rights” and “reserving powers” in the way that much of the
modern scholarship suggests.
15. See, e.g., Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J.
1104, 1171–74 (2013) (describing the emergence of the anticommandeering principle postratification); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
932, 1017–18 (2010) (observing that Federalists and Republicans had “a tendency to reargue”
constitutional issues of foreign policy that had appeared settled at the time of ratification); Richard
Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States,
117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018) (presenting Madison’s enumerated-powers argument against the
national bank, and the ensuing debate, as novel).
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had long been backward-looking, replete with claims about the fundamental
law that had existed since “[t]ime immemorial.” 16 But as historian Jonathan
Gienapp has revealed, the idea of constitutional fixity took a new form in the
early 1790s as Americans came to associate the writtenness of the
constitutional text with a permanence in constitutional meaning. 17 In other
words, the Founders increasingly viewed their own constitutionalism as a
new type of enterprise, rooted in the interpretation of a historical document
with fixed meaning.
With the Republican invention of First Amendment federalism, these
strands of Founding Era constitutionalism powerfully collided. Republicans
explicitly made arguments about the emergence of a new and unanticipated
constitutional problem: the partisan selection of federal jurors. That point
bears repeating. Republicans openly discussed the existence of new problems
that, in their view, required a particular construction of the First Amendment.
Yet when making these observations, they were constrained by the incipient
notion of a fixed constitution, limiting their ability to articulate a case for
interpretive change. The result was a sharp disjunction in their practice and
rhetoric. Republicans adopted a novel constitutional position, based on a
forceful argument about how long-held principles ought to apply to new
circumstances, all the while casting their argument in originalist terms.
Demonstrating the novelty of the Republican position against the
Sedition Act begins in Part I with a survey of debates about expressive
freedom a decade earlier. Discussions of speech and press freedoms at that
point featured an assortment of ideas, but no one articulated a theory of the
First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses premised on federalism. To be
sure, some Founders had more robust theories of expressive freedom than
others, and some had a limited view of congressional power to restrict
expression under Article I. But nobody thought that the First Amendment had
a categorical effect while state constitutional guarantees did not. The whole
point of enumerating federal speech and press rights, in fact, was to ensure
parity in the protection of those rights at the federal and state levels. At the
same time, this Part illuminates the more flexible thinking about rights in the
1780s that helped shape Republican thinking about the Sedition Act a decade
later.
Part II turns to the Cabell affair, explaining how Republicans came to
realize that the advent of political parties, combined with the hand selection
of jurors, opened the door to substantial partisan abuses. Partisanship, in other
words, undermined the effectiveness of conventional speech and press

16. JOHN P HILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLOAMERICAN L IBERTY 29–30 (2005).
17. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: F IXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN
THE F OUNDING ERA (2018).
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freedoms.18 And with these concerns in mind, Jefferson and his political allies
began to shift toward a new view of the First Amendment—all of this
occurring months before the Sedition Act was even conceived.
The Sedition Act is addressed in Part III, with a focus on the Republican
opposition. As is true with any innovative thinking, Republican ideas about
the First Amendment reflected continuity with certain strands of their earlier
views. When opposing state authority to levy taxes to support religious
instruction in Virginia in the mid-1780s, for instance, Jefferson and Madison
had described the inalienable natural right to conscience in a way that
categorically disclaimed state power to legislate on religious matters.
(Notably, their argument lacked any federalism dimension.) And a few years
later, during the ratification debates, some Founders had denied the existence
of any affirmative federal power to regulate printers under Article I.
Moreover, when emphasizing that hand selecting jurors effectively allowed
the administration to decide its own cases, Republicans tapped into a
longstanding natural-law principle that “a man is not to be a judge in his own
cause.”19 These constitutional traditions provided crucial ingredients for later
developments in Republican thought.
What was strikingly novel about the opposition to the Sedition Act,
however, was their conclusion: The First Amendment imposed a categorical
ban on federal power to regulate expression even though analogous state
constitutional guarantees did not. Faced with dire concerns about the
administration of a federal sedition law, Republicans sought to transform the
Speech and Press Clauses into a rule about the allocation of federal and state
power. Rather than argue that new circumstances required a change in
constitutional interpretation, however, Republicans cast their argument in
terms of original meaning. The First Amendment, Madison asserted in his
famous Virginia Report of 1800, “was meant as a positive denial to Congress,
of any power whatever on the subject.”20
Part IV evaluates the Republican effort to revise history. It hardly needs
mention that the Sedition Act deserves its place as a national embarrassment.
But that is no reason to afford a mythical status to its opposition. Republican
constitutional arguments against the Sedition Act—though still defended by

18. For an assessment of the broader constitutional impact of the development of parties, see
generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312 (2006).
19. Anarchy, To the Anti-Federal Electors of the County of Dutchess, POUGHKEEPSIE
COUNTRY J., Mar. 18, 1788, reprinted in 21 T HE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1449, 1450 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2005); see also, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan University Press 1961)
(“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra, at 538
(Alexander Hamilton) (“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”).
20. James Madison, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
303, 339 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991); see id. at 340 (declaring that the First Amendment
“was intended as a positive and absolute reservation” of any “power whatever over the press”).
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many scholars and often used in modern constitutional argument 21—were
deeply problematic. Contorted understandings of history and federalism, not
a liberal conception of expressive freedom, endured as the oft-invoked
“principles of ‘98.”
But rather than abandoning the Republican opposition to the Sedition
Act as a centerpiece of our constitutional tradition, perhaps we might elevate
it in a different way. The enduring insight of Republicans was not their
wholly invented idea that the Speech and Press Clauses were designed as a
federalism rule. Nor was it a theoretical account of why speech deserves
special constitutional protection—a perspective that dominates modern
judicial decisions and academic commentary on expressive freedom. 22 As
argued elsewhere, “[H]istory undermines the notion that the First
Amendment itself embraces a particular rationale for protecting
expression.” 23 The Republican invention of First Amendment federalism,
which also lacked a theoretical account, bolsters that conclusion. 24 Rather,
the enduring insight of Republicans was that speech-restrictive rules are
dangerous when designed and implemented to entrench political power.
That idea could help reorient First Amendment doctrine today. As
originally designed, the First Amendment recognized only a few determinate
rules and otherwise left the government free to regulate speech and the press
to promote the public good. The Republicans opposed to the Sedition Act
tapped into this principle, worried that Federalists were not pursuing the
interests of the whole political society but instead were simply trying to
entrench their own power. As we will see, several foundational First
Amendment decisions in the twentieth century stem from a similar concern
about partiality in governmental decisions. 25 Since then, however, doctrine
has gravitated toward an overriding (and ahistorical) emphasis on content and
viewpoint neutrality. Perhaps it is time to bring the pursuit of the public good
back to the fore.
I.

The First Amendment

To understand how Republicans reinterpreted the First Amendment in
the late 1790s, we first need to consider where matters stood a decade earlier.

21. E.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
PRESS IN AMERICA 47–48 (1991); Bybee, supra note 9, at 1556, 1567–71. For further
discussion, see infra notes 259–62 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 nn.6–8, 1768 (2004) (listing
several theories).
23. Campbell, supra note 8, at 262.
24. To be sure, a minority of Republicans made theory-based arguments that have become
significant to our modern constitutional ethos. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 38, 119, 245 (1993) (drawing on James Madison’s ideas).
25. See infra subpart IV(B).
THE

CAMPBELL.P RINTING (DO NOT DELETE)

526

2/14/2019 11:28 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:517

Two points deserve emphasis up front. First, although the term “rights” had
a variety of meanings, rights generally were not the inverse of powers,
disabling the government from acting within an entire field. Second, the
Speech and Press Clauses were designed to provide protections at the federal
level that were equivalent to those created at the state level by state bills of
rights. The constitutional arguments levied a decade later by Republicans
against the Sedition Act were thus doubly innovative.
But rights discourse in the late 1780s provides more than just a contrast
to arguments against the Sedition Act a decade later. The prevailing
conception of rights at the Founding also helps reveal how and why
Republicans were able to invent an entirely new understanding of the First
Amendment in so little time. Again, two points deserve emphasis. First,
speech and press freedoms empowered juries to decide cases involving
governmental restrictions of expression. This feature put extraordinary
pressure on Republicans to come up with a new understanding of the First
Amendment once the protection of a jury in sedition cases was, in their view,
undermined by the partisan selection of jurors. Second, and more
fundamentally, the philosophical ideas underpinning American thinking
about rights had inculcated flexible and dynamic interpretive ideas among
the Founders. And these older habits of mind lingered late into the 1790s,
even as Americans increasingly framed their constitutional arguments in
fixed terms.
A. Eighteenth-Century Rights
Founding Era constitutionalism was grounded in social-contract
theory.26 This theory was premised on a thought experiment designed to
reveal the purposes and limits of governmental authority. It did so by asking,
hypothetically, what would lead individuals to form a political community in
the first place—an agreement known as a “social compact” or “social
contract.” After creating a body politic, the theory went, the people would
then agree to form a government through an instrument known as a
“constitution.” 27
American understandings of rights in the late 1780s flowed from this
theory. All individuals, social-contract theory posited, surrendered some of
their “natural rights”—or their rights to life, liberty, and property in an
imagined “state of nature” 28—for the greater security of those rights as a
26. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT.
85, 87–88 (2017).
27. Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained”
by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 267, 271 (1992); see also sources cited infra note 29.
28. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (ratified 1780) (“All men . . . have certain natural,
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending
their lives and liberties; [and] that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property . . . .”), amended
by MASS. CONST. amend. CVI; see also MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE N ATURAL R IGHTS REPUBLIC :
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whole. The point of retaining natural rights, however, was not to make certain
aspects of natural liberty immune from governmental regulation. Rather,
retained natural rights were aspects of natural liberty that could be restricted
only with just cause and only with consent of the body politic.29 Natural rights
retained by the people were subject to regulation by the people.
It was impractical, of course, for the entire body of the people to exercise
power directly, so Americans looked to representative institutions for that
purpose. Not surprisingly, the most important representative institutions were
legislatures, and retained natural liberty could therefore be restricted pursuant
to law. William Blackstone summed it up nicely in his Commentaries,
remarking that the natural right “of acting as one thinks fit” is exchanged for
civil liberty, which “is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human
laws . . . as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public.” 30
But legislatures were not the only representative bodies. Juries, too,
served in a representative capacity. In modern constitutional law, we tend to
think of juries as factfinding bodies and jury rights as procedural
safeguards.31 Juries in the eighteenth century, however, were not simply, or
even primarily, empaneled to protect criminal defendants and civil litigants.
Rather, jurors acted as representatives of the entire political society. 32 As
John Adams privately noted, “the People are by the Constitution appointed
to take [part], in the passing and Execution of Laws.”33 In an overstated but
revealing comment, Thomas Jefferson went even further: “Were I called
upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or

STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 77–82 (1996) (exploring
the treatment of these concepts in the writings of Thomas Jefferson).
29. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 92–98 (exploring this concept); Hamburger, supra note 8,
at 909 (same); Barry A. Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the Declaration of Independence (same),
in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 116, 132, 139–41 (Barry
Alan Shain ed., 2007); see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 272 n.114 (collecting additional sources).
30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121.
31. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (2004) (noting this view).
32. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of Juries (explaining this view in connection to social-contract
theory), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 954, 960 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall,
eds., 2007); see also KRAMER, supra note 31, at 70 (“[T]he eighteenth-century view was more
complex.”); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS : POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 295 (1996) (“[R]epresentation and jury trial were dual securities for . . . personal
rights.”); JOHN P HILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL H ISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: T HE
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 50–52 (1986) (surveying eighteenth-century views of juries); William
Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case
of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 536 (2007) (discussing the representative view of
juries).
33. John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771) (emphasis added), in 1
LEGAL P APERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 228 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
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Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the
Legislative.” 34
Because the natural rights of life, liberty, and property could be
restricted only with the consent of the body politic, juries were integral to the
American legal system. 35 “Juries are taken by Lot or by Suffrage from the
Mass of the People,” Adams declared, “and no Man can be condemned of
Life, or Limb, or Property or Reputation, without the Concurrence of the
Voice of the People.” 36 This view was conventional. “Juries are constantly
and frequently drawn from the body of the people, and freemen of the
country,” Federal Farmer later explained, “and by holding the jury’s right to
return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large,
their just and rightful controul in the judicial department.” 37
According to social-contract theory, the creation of a body politic set the
stage for a “constitution” in which the people created a government by
majority consent. 38 In the English tradition, the constitution was customary,
stemming from longstanding traditions and an assortment of seminal
documents.39 And these customary protections included a variety of
“constitutional” or “fundamental” positive rights that were defined in terms
of governmental authority. Notably, some of these rules, like the right to a
jury trial and the rule against ex post facto laws, limited how the government
could restrict natural liberty.
Social-contract theory thus shaped American thinking about rights, and
the following subpart will discuss speech and press freedoms in particular.
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE P APERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
35. See, e.g., Virginia Assembly Debates (Dec. 14, 1798) (statement of Del. George K. Taylor)
(“[N]atural rights . . . could not be deprived . . . without a trial by Jury.”), in DEBATES IN THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, UPON CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE HOUSE, UPON
THE IMPORTANT S UBJECT OF THE ACTS OF CONGRESS P ASSED AT THEIR L AST SESSION,
COMMONLY C ALLED, T HE ALIEN AND SEDITION L AWS 18 (Richmond, Thomas Nicolson 1818)
[hereinafter DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA].
36. Adams, supra note 33, at 229.
37. FEDERAL F ARMER, LETTER XV TO THE REPUBLIC (1788), reprinted in 20 THE
DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1043, 1048–49 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 2004).
38. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *52 (“[A] state is a collective
body . . . [that] can therefore be no otherwise produced than by a political union; by the consent of
all persons . . . according to [the state’s] constitution[] . . . .”); John Adams, Preliminary
Observations (“The first ‘collection’ of authority must be an unanimous agreement to form
themselves into a nation, people, community, or body politic . . . .”), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 299, 301 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1851); James Madison,
Sovereignty (“[L]et us consult the Theory which contemplates a certain number of individuals as
meeting and agreeing to form one political society, in order that the rights the safety & the interest
of each may be under the safeguard of the whole.”), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 568,
570 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
39. See generally JOHN P HILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL H ISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 4 vols. (1986–1993) (comparing British and American constitutional thought). For a
shorter discussion, see KRAMER, supra note 31, at 9–34.
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But another point is worth emphasis. Social-contract theory trained
Americans to think and speak about foundational principles in potentially
conflicting terms.
On the one hand, social-contract theory prized arguments about the
happiness of the political society as a whole—a highly underdeterminate
standard that created substantial room for debate. As Joseph Priestley noted,
there was “a real difficulty in determining what general rules, respecting the
extent of the power of government, or of governors, are most conducive to
the public good.”40 The social contract, we must remember, was not a real
agreement; its content was determined by abstract reasoning. This gave the
social contract a dynamic, evolutionary character.
At the same time, however, the Founders often talked about the social
contract as if it were a historical agreement. 41 They often debated its content,
for instance, by invoking what the common law had been since “time
immemorial,” even without any historical basis for those claims. 42 Moreover,
many Founders thought that one of the most reliable ways of ascertaining the
dictates of reason was by looking to the lessons of experience, and
particularly the customary traditions of the common law. 43 Founding Era
constitutionalism thus trained Americans to think and speak about
foundational principles in potentially conflicting ways. Republicans would
take that training to heart a decade later.
B. Speech and Press Freedoms
The Founders often described the freedom of speaking, writing, and
publishing as a retained natural right. 44 Ordinarily, as we have seen, such
“rights” were subject to legislative restrictions that promoted the public good.
Unsurprisingly, then, English and American law recognized plenty of
limitations on speech through rules against defamation, blasphemy, perjury,
profane swearing, and so forth. 45 A series of restrictive English efforts to
40. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE F IRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE
NATURE OF POLITICAL, C IVIL, AND RELIGIOUS L IBERTY 59 (London, J. Dodsley et al. 1768).
41. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of Citizens and Aliens (describing the formation of the social
contract historically but then discerning the terms of the social contract through reasoning, not
historical inquiry), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 32, at 1038, 1045;
Brutus II, N.Y.J., Nov. 1, 1787 (same), reprinted in 19 T HE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 154, 154–55 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003).
42. See REID, supra note 32, at 28–40 (reviewing the concept of “immemoriality”).
43. Campbell, supra note 8, at 290–92.
44. See id. at 265 n.73 (collecting sources).
45. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals (discussing limits of the
freedom of speech), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 32, at 1053, 1066;
William Livingston, Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, INDEP. REFLECTOR (N.Y.C.), Aug.
30, 1753 (“Civil Liberty is built upon a Surrender of so much of our natural Liberty, as is necessary
for the good Ends of Government; and the Liberty of the Press, is always to be restricted from
becoming a Prejudice to the public Weal.”), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER
TO JEFFERSON 75, 79 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Carolina Acad. Press 1996); Jacob Rush, The Nature
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insulate the government from public criticism, however, led political
theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to view the freedom of
speaking, writing, and publishing as vital to representative government.
Particularly important in this effort were the widely read essays that
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon published under the pseudonym Cato
in the early 1720s. In his essay, “Of Freedom of Speech,” Gordon highlighted
the connection between public discussion and republican government:
That men ought to speak well of their governors, is true, while their
governors deserve to be well spoken of; but to do publick mischief,
without hearing of it, is only the prerogative and felicity of tyranny: A
free people will be shewing that they are so, by their freedom of
speech.
The administration of government is nothing else, but the
attendance of the trustees of the people upon the interest and affairs of
the people. And as it is the part and business of the people, for whose
sake alone all publick matters are, or ought to be, transacted, to see
whether they be well or ill transacted; so it is the interest, and ought to
be the ambition, of all honest magistrates, to have their deeds openly
examined, and publickly scanned . . . .46
Gordon essentially argued that overregulation of speech was against the
public interest because it deprived the public of useful, perhaps even
essential, information about their government.
This understanding of the freedom of speech, viewed through the lens
of popular sovereignty, dominated American discourse about the right. “The
citizen under a free government,” James Wilson explained in his law lectures,
“has a right to think, to speak, to write, to print, and to publish freely, but
with decency and truth, concerning publick men, publick bodies, and publick
measures.”47 Others widely agreed that open public discussion was essential
to republican government. 48
To be sure, not all criticism of government was okay. Carefully
delineated governmental power to punish sedition, for instance, was usually
accepted even among otherwise “liberal” writers like Cato.49 For most
of an Oath Stated and Explained (Aug. 8, 1796) (defending bans on profane swearing because it
“lessen[s] that awe and reverence of the Supreme Being, which is one of the strongest guards against
perjury; and consequently be in a high degree injurious to society”), in C HARGES AND EXTRACTS
OF CHARGES, ON MORAL AND RELIGIOUS S UBJECTS 25, 31 (Phila., D. Hogan 1803).
46. [THOMAS GORDON], OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: T HAT THE S AME IS INSEPARABLE FROM
PUBLICK L IBERTY (1720), reprinted in 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S
LETTERS: OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND O THER IMPORTANT S UBJECTS 110,
111 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995).
47. WILSON, supra note 41, at 1046.
48. See BUEL, supra note 6, at 93–112 (esp. 93), 128–35, 244–61 (esp. 250, 255–57) (offering
a balanced assessment of Federalist views).
49. For recognitions of the general approval of sedition laws in the eighteenth century, see
BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 2; HOFFER, supra note 6, at 139; LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF
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people, the right to make well-intentioned statements hardly included a
corollary right to deceive others. Nonetheless, Americans recognized the
importance of remaining vigilant against governmental efforts to suppress
dissent under the pretext of fighting sedition. In an essay written after he
successfully defended John Peter Zenger against charges of sedition, James
Alexander explained that
abuses of the Freedom of Speech are the excrescences of Liberty. They
ought to be suppressed; but to whom dare we commit the care of doing
it? An evil Magistrate entrusted with a power to punish Words is
armed with a Weapon the most destructive and terrible. Under
pretense of pruning off the exuberant branches, he frequently destroys
the tree.50
The English and American response was a constitutional right commonly
known as the liberty of the press.
The liberty of the press put juries in control of governmental efforts to
regulate expression. First, the principle barred the government from
instituting a licensing regime—the famous rule against “previous restraints
upon publications” 51—meaning that jurors rather than governmental censors
would have the final word on efforts to control publishing. “The liberty of
the press, as established in England,” Jean Louis de Lolme explained, ensured
that libel prosecutions would “proceed by the Trial by Jury.” 52
Controversially, William Blackstone argued that the right afforded no
“freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.” 53 But American
views were more complex. Juries had the power to give general verdicts, and
many Americans thought that the truth of putatively seditious statements was
a proper ground for acquittal.54
SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN E ARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (1960)
[hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION ]; Berns, supra note 13, at 134; Bogen, supra note 8,
at 462; Hamburger, supra note 8, at 910–11; Philip B. Kurland, The Original Understanding of the
Freedom of the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55 MISS. L.J. 225, 252 (1985); and Rabban,
supra note 8, at 810, 823. The acceptance of sedition laws, however, was by no means unanimous.
In a revised and retitled version of his pathbreaking and controversial book, Legacy of Suppression,
Leonard Levy offered contradictory remarks about the original meaning of the First Amendment.
LEVY, supra note 8, at 272–74.
50. James Alexander, Letter to the Editor, Free Speech Is a Pillar of Free Government, PA.
GAZETTE (Phila.), Nov. 17, 1737, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON, supra note 45, at 62, 62–63.
51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52.
52. JEAN-LOUIS DE LOLME, T HE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR AN ACCOUNT OF THE
ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 283 (London, T. Spilsbury 1775).
53. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52. Notably, however, Blackstone
assumed that “the object of legal punishment” was “the disseminating or making public of bad
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society” and that “to censure the licentiousness is to maintain
the liberty of the press.” Id. at *152–53.
54. This issue remained contested for a long time. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to William
Cushing (Mar. 7, 1789) (“The difficult and important question is whether the Truth of words can be
admitted by the court to be given in evidence to the jury, upon a plea of not guilty?”), in FREEDOM
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Juries thus linked the common law right of press freedom to the retained
natural right of speaking, publishing, and writing—together guaranteeing
popular control over any efforts to abridge expression. Only one early state
constitution explicitly recognized both principles. The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 declared that “the people have a right to freedom of
speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom
of the press ought not to be restrained.”55 Meanwhile, constitutions in other
states mentioned only the liberty of the press. 56 But by maintaining a
republican form of government and ensuring the right to a jury trial, other
states implicitly protected unmentioned natural rights, including the freedom
of speaking, writing, and publishing.
Founding Era discussions of the liberty of the press thus reflect a foreign
way of thinking. From our modern perspective, speech and press freedoms
operate primarily as substantive limits on legislative power. The government
cannot regulate speech based on the viewpoint being expressed; restrictions
of speech based on its communicative content are presumptively
unconstitutional; and so forth. 57 Moreover, because expressive freedom
operates as a set of substantive legal rules, judges are specially charged with
ensuring that the government stays within its proper legal limits. 58
From this perspective, scholars have voiced exasperation with the idea
that the freedom of the press was confined to a rule against prior restraints.
Limiting regulations of expression to lawful restraints, Wendell Bird writes,
would have made press freedom “nothing but a tautology.”59 Indeed, defining
expressive freedom in a way that lacked substantive content would be
directly contrary to the modern definition of constitutional rights.
In the eighteenth century, however, it was anything but a tautology to
OF THE PRESS FROM

ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, supra note 45, at 152, 153; Kate Elizabeth Brown,
Rethinking People v. Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the Nature and Scope of “Common Law”
in the Early Republic, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 611, 612–13, 639–41 (2014) (recounting a famous
1803–1804 New York controversy over the truth defense). American judges sometimes ruled that
“a defendant could establish the truth of the publication only to show that he lacked the requisite
malicious intent.” David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel
into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL H IST. 154, 192 (2001).
55. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, art. XII. Vermont, which was not yet recognized as an American
state, also mentioned the freedom of speech in its constitution. See VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art.
XV (“That the people have a right of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their
sentiments, concerning the transactions of government—and therefore the freedom of the press
ought not to be restrained.”).
56. Anderson, supra note 8, at 464–65, app. at 538–41.
57. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 406, 420 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (“Judges,
as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any [defamation] judgment that
is not supported by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’”).
59. WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: T HE E ARLY S UPREME COURT
JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE C AMPAIGN AGAINST D ISSENT 11 (2016).
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affirm that the government could restrict natural liberty only pursuant to laws
passed by a representative legislature and enforced by a jury. Founding Era
constitutional thought, after all, was obsessed with the dangers of unbounded
governmental discretion, particularly when public officials had their own
interests at stake. Consequently, acting pursuant to known laws passed and
executed with popular consent was, as Alexander Hamilton put it, “the very
essence of civil liberty” and the antithesis of arbitrary rule.60
The need for representative control over the creation and execution of
law was especially profound in the context of sedition because of a famed
axiom in eighteenth-century constitutional thought: “No man is allowed to
be a judge in his own cause.”61 When someone criticized the government, the
Founders widely thought, it would be downright dangerous to give agents of
the government, including prosecutors and judges, the power to punish
governmental critics. In this context, giving power to juries was crucial.
Commentators during the ratification debates explicitly linked jury
rights to concerns about governmental suppression of dissent. The
“interposition of a jury,” one writer explained, was an essential shield against
self-interested prosecutions:
The Chief Magistrate, or the Legislature itself, of a republic, is as
liable to personal prejudice, and to passion, as any King in Europe;
and might prosecute a bold writer, or any other person, who had
become obnoxious to their resentment, with as much violence and
rigour. What so admirable a barrier to defend the innocent, and protect
the weak from the attacks of power, as the interposition of a jury? In
this respect, the trial by jury may well be called the palladium of
liberty.62

60. ALEXANDER H AMILTON, THE F ARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE P APERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 100 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961); see REID, supra note 16, at 38–39
(explaining the eighteenth-century conception of arbitrary rule); see also HAMILTON, supra, at 100
(“When any people are ruled by laws, in framing which, they have no part, that are to bind them, to
all intents and purposes, without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are
in the strictest sense slaves, and the government with respect to them, is despotic.”).
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 19, at 59 (James Madison); accord, e.g., Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“[A] law that makes a man a Judge in
his own cause . . . is against all reason and justice . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 19,
at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) (“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”).
Indeed, the rule that no man should judge his own cause was the foundation of one of Edward
Coke’s most famous decisions. See Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652; 8 Co. Rep.
107 a, 118 a (“[O]ne cannot be Judge and attorney for any of the parties . . . .”); see also R.H.
Helmholz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325,
335 (2009) (“There is no doubt . . . that acting as a judge in one’s own cause had long been regarded
as a violation of the law of nature.”).
62. A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 2, at 686. As Theophilus Parsons proclaimed during the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention:
Let him be considered as a criminal by the general government, yet only his own fellow
citizens can convict him—they are his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not
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Jury protections were essential, another Anti-Federalist exclaimed, because
the government “will easily find pretexts” to restrain “what it may please
them to call—the licentiousness of the press.”63 As Virginia lawyer
Alexander White summarized, “should I be unjustly accused of [sedition],
the trial by a jury of my countrymen is my security.”64
These writers could hardly anticipate what lay ahead. The emergence of
political parties, combined with the power of the federal administration to
hand select jurors in key states, would soon undermine the sanctified status
of juries as neutral arbiters in sedition cases.
C. The First Amendment
Late in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, a few delegates pushed for
a guarantee of the liberty of the press, but these proposals were narrowly
defeated.65 The Constitution thus emerged without any express protections
for the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing, or for the liberty of the
press. As it turned out, the omission of a bill of rights became one of the most
contentious issues during the ratification contest.
A complete review of the ratification debates is unnecessary, but a few
points are worth highlighting. First, although the Anti-Federalists made all
sorts of creative arguments against ratification, nobody seems to have
mentioned that the Constitution would threaten the retained natural right to
the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing. 66 This silence did not stop
all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce
him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation.
Massachusetts Ratification Convention Debates (Jan. 23, 1788) (statement of Theophilus Parsons),
in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1313, 1328 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000); see also, e.g., [Samuel Bryan], Centinel I, INDEP.
GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1787 (“[I]f I use my pen with the boldness of a freeman, it is because
I know that the liberty of the press yet remains unviolated, and juries yet are judges.”), reprinted in
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 158, 159 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976); Letter from John Adams to William Cushing, supra note 54, at 153 (“[I]f the jury
found [the putatively libelous statements] true and that they were published for the Public good,
they would readily acquit.”).
63. Cincinnatus I: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y.J., Nov. 1, 1787 [hereinafter Cincinnatus I],
reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 41, at 160, 163.
64. Alexander White, To the Citizens of Virginia, WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788,
reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 402,
405 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
65. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 341, 587–88, 617 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
66. Using the Pennsylvania Constitution as a template, several state ratification conventions
mentioned the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing in a preamble to their recognition of
the liberty of the press. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF R IGHTS: T HE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES,
AND ORIGINS 93 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (proposals of North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia,
and the Pennsylvania minority); see also The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution,
VA. INDEP. CHRON. (Richmond), Apr. 30, 1788 (“That the people have a right to the freedom of
speech, of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore printing presses shall not be subject to
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Alexander Hamilton and his friends from lambasting Anti-Federalists for
misunderstanding the protection for rights in republican governments. Where
the people retain sovereignty, Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 84, “in
strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they
have no need of particular reservations.”67 But if Hamilton was referring to
speech freedom, he was responding to a straw man; the freedom of speech
was ignored during the ratification controversy. 68
The omission of a clause protecting the liberty of the press, by contrast,
was one of the leading Anti-Federalist objections. Significantly, however,
nobody seems to have advocated for the liberty of the press as a way of
uniquely constraining federal authority relative to state authority. That is,
there is no evidence of anyone suggesting that a federal ban on abridging the
liberty of the press would take a different meaning than its state counterparts.
To be sure, Federalists occasionally asserted that the new government would
have no authority over the press under Article I.69 (More commonly,
however, Federalists simply denied that any government could abrogate
fundamental positive rights. 70) And Anti-Federalist “references to press
freedom were usually cursory, with no elaboration about what the term meant
or what a declaration in its favor would accomplish.” 71 Nonetheless,
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike never suggested that federal protection

restraint, other than liableness to legal prosecution, for false facts printed and published.”), reprinted
in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at
769, 773.
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton).
68. See, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (statement of Patrick
Henry) (mentioning only press freedom), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1299, 1332 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1993); FEDERAL F ARMER, LETTER VI TO THE REPUBLIC (1788) (same), in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 979, 985; see also
Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the
Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (2011) (“As for freedom of speech, anti-Federalists
said virtually nothing about it.”). To be fair to Hamilton, Anti-Federalists had voiced concerns about
all sorts of infractions on other forms of retained natural liberty. See Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial
Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–17 (1994) (describing Anti-Federalists’ appeals for a
“remarkably long list of rights,” even including a right to hunt).
69. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 300 n.242 (collecting sources).
70. E.g., A CITIZEN OF NEW YORK [JOHN JAY], AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK (1788), reprinted in 20 T HE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 922, 933; Foederal Constitution, PA. GAZETTE (Phila.), Oct.
10, 1787, reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 362, 363–64 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); Uncus, MD. J.
(Balt.), Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 76, 78 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983).
71. Campbell, supra note 8, at 296.
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for the liberty of the press would somehow be more capacious than its statelevel counterparts.72
Indeed, the principal Anti-Federalist argument was that the federal
constitution—just like state constitutions—ought to mention fundamental
rights like press freedom. “The powers, rights, and authority, granted to the
general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect to
every object to which they extend, as that of any state government,” Brutus
explained.73 To Anti-Federalists, parity in the means of federal and state
power warranted the enumeration of the same rights at both levels.
Over time, some Federalists recognized merit in that argument. 74
Among them, most significantly, was James Madison, who emphasized this
point in his speech on June 8, 1789, introducing a set of amendments to the
House of Representatives. Although congressional powers were limited,
Madison explained, Congress had “certain discretionary powers with respect
to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same
manner as the powers of the State Governments under their constitutions may
to an indefinite extent.”75 Thus, the people would benefit from having their
rights guarded against federal power, too.
For the most part, Madison’s push for amendments met with Federalist
indifference, and congressional debates on the topic are largely
unilluminating. 76 Strikingly, however, nobody so much as hinted that
proposed federal protections for expression might differ in meaning from
their state counterparts. Indeed, Madison’s draft followed nearly word-forword the language and structure of Pennsylvania’s speech and press clauses:
“The people,” Madison proposed, “shall not be deprived or abridged of their
right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the
72. Support for this statement comes from the author’s review of every mention of the word
“press” in the first twenty-four volumes of The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution.
73. Brutus II, supra note 41, at 156; see also, e.g., Cincinnatus I, supra note 63, at 162 (“The
conventions that made the state and the general constitutions, sprang from the same source, were
delegated for the same purpose . . . .”).
74. Thomas Jefferson may deserve some credit for stimulating shifts in Madison’s views. See,
e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789) (“[I]n a constitutive act which
leaves some precious articles unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of
rights becomes necessary by way of supplement.”), in 14 THE P APERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659,
660 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: T HE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 443–46 (2010) (summarizing Jefferson’s correspondence with
Madison over adding a declaration of rights).
75. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). The editors of the
Annals of Congress published two versions of the first two volumes. These versions have different
pagination but identical title pages, making it necessary to distinguish them by the page headings
(“History of Congress” or “Gales & Seaton’s History of Debates in Congress”) rather than
publication details. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 91 n.27. Citations in this Article are to the
“History of Congress” volumes.
76. See Rabban, supra note 8, at 814 (“[T]he few congressional comments on the proposed first
amendment were brief, ambiguous, and apathetic.” (citing LEVY, supra note 8)).
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press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”77 The final
House version was shorter—simply declaring that “[t]he freedom of speech,
and of the press . . . shall not be infringed”—but again without any suggestion
of a novel meaning. 78 Again, the whole impetus for enumerating rights at the
federal level was to recognize “simple, acknowledged principles” that states
had already widely embraced. 79
Indeed, decisive evidence points in the opposite direction. When it first
endorsed the Speech and Press Clauses, the House also passed an amendment
providing, “No State shall infringe . . . the freedom of speech, or of the
press.” 80 This provision reinforces that the First Amendment did not
withdraw all federal authority to regulate expression. Put simply, “If
infringements of speech and press freedoms arose from any controls over
expression, then this proposal would have barred state laws against
defamation, conspiracy, threats, profanity, blasphemy, perjury, sedition, and
so forth.”81 No evidence suggests that any congressman, much less a majority
of the House, had such a radical agenda in mind. 82 The First Amendment and
its state-restricting counterpart thus did not, at least in the view of the House,
categorically bar governmental control over expression. 83
Nor does the language of the First Amendment suggest a lack of federal
power over expression. Scholars who defend that position often point to the
First Amendment’s opening phrase, “Congress shall make no law . . . .” 84
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). Pennsylvania’s
constitution specified that “the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and
publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained.” P A.
CONST. of 1776, ch. I, art. XII.
78. House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE F IRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA 27, 28 (Charlene Bangs Bickford &
Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
79. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
80. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789) (emphasis added), in 4
DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE F IRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA,
supra note 78, at 35, 39.
81. Campbell, supra note 8, at 313.
82. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 502, 508 (refuting the notion that any of the Framers
considered the Speech and Press Clauses to be absolute prohibitions); Bogen, supra note 8, at 458
n.143 (“Because no one spoke against the adoption of a guarantee of freedom of speech and of the
press as placing too strong a limit on government . . . any notion that the framers intended all
statements to be immune from federal prosecution is hard to credit.”).
83. Some modern textualists would endorse this use of “drafting history” arguments. See John
F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 737 n.272 (1997)
(“[T]extualist judges . . . do not categorically exclude a statute’s drafting evolution from their
consideration of statutory context.”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 361
(2005) (“[M]any textualists use records of a bill’s drafting history . . . to shed light on how members
of the enacting legislature understood the resulting statute . . . .”). Notably, Congress has
constitutional authority to draft and propose amendments, whereas the Philadelphia Convention of
1787, whose then-secretive proceedings are afforded less weight in modern originalist theory, was
not authorized to draft the Constitution.
84. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From
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Simply put, however, a ban on passing laws that abridge a certain right in no
way suggests a lack of power to pass laws that do not abridge that right. If
anything, the appropriate inference at the Founding was precisely the
opposite, thus supporting an inference that federal authority included at least
some room for regulating expression. 85
Before turning to the 1790s, it is worth pausing a moment to consider
the First Congress’s treatment of another form of natural liberty: religious
freedom. In the 1780s, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had creatively
argued that the retained natural right of freedom of conscience meant “that
Religion is wholly exempt from [governmental] cognizance.” 86 Relying on
this position, scholars have read the First Amendment as following this
categorical (some say “jurisdictional”) approach to natural rights, thus
completely depriving the government of all authority with respect to
religion.87 Republicans, too, frequently invoked religious freedom during the
Sedition Act debates in support of their innovative reading of the First
Amendment.88
Although Jefferson and Madison’s “jurisdictional” arguments about
religious freedom surely informed their responses to the Sedition Act, there
are compelling reasons to doubt that it reflected their thinking about
expressive freedom in 1789, much less the thinking of their contemporaries.
First, the “jurisdictional” argument was highly creative. 89 “Retaining” natural

the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 791 (2008)
(“The introductory clause, ‘Congress shall make no law,’ which originated in the Senate, exactly
paralleled the Federalist position on the press clause; that there was no affirmative power in the
Constitution that granted Congress the ability to regulate the press.”); Leonard W. Levy,
Introduction (citing the introductory clause for the view that Congress was “totally without power
to enact legislation respecting the press”), in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON,
supra note 45, at xix, lvi–lvii.
85. See infra note 266 (collecting sources).
86. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (ca. June 20,
1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
Jefferson articulated the idea in a draft bill that Virginia’s legislature did not end up passing until
1786. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in 2 THE P APERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
87. E.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1113 (1994); Vincent Phillip Muñoz,
James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 23 (2003).
88. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2105 (1798) (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Macon) (“[I]f a
law like this was passed, to abridge the liberty of the press, Congress would have the same right to
pass a law making an establishment of religion, or to prohibit its free exercise . . . .”); id. at 2153
(statement of Rep. Edward Livingston) (“Gentlemen may tomorrow establish a national religion
agreeably to the opinion of a majority of this House . . . . The doing of this is not less forbidden than
the act which the House are about to do.”).
89. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 353 (calling such arguments
“unconventional”). Some earlier commentators took the same position as Jefferson, e.g., RONALD
M. PETERS, JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT 79–86 (1974),
but this was decidedly a “minority point of view,” id. at 86.
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rights, after all, did not bar their regulation through law. Liberty and property,
for example, were retained natural rights, but nobody viewed these freedoms
as beyond governmental control. So, too, with religion. American states
broadly recognized the inalienable natural right of conscience—a firm ban
on direct punishment of religious belief—while simultaneously maintaining
a diverse array of rules that dealt with religion, including religious taxes and
religious qualifications for holding public office.
Moreover, Madison and his colleagues in the First Congress—many of
whom were paranoid about protecting state establishments—never suggested
that their proposed state-restraining amendment, which guaranteed a right of
free exercise against state governments, might stealthily ban all remaining
state support for religion. 90 Rather, that proposal strongly indicates that the
natural-rights guarantees in the First Amendment—including the protections
for speech and conscience91—did not categorically deprive the federal
government of authority with respect to those topics.
In any event, whatever one thinks of the meaning of speech and press
freedoms in the late 1780s, the simple fact remains that nobody so much as
hinted that a guarantee of those rights in the federal constitution had a
“jurisdictional” meaning, whereas analogous provisions in state constitutions
left ample room for state governments to regulate harmful speech. In other
words, no one in the 1780s articulated the interpretation of the federal Speech
and Press Clauses that Republicans invented a decade later. Many aspects of
Founding Era thought were contested or unclear,92 but this was not one of
them. The Founders were not imposing a categorical ban on federal power
over expression, and they did not suggest that the federal Speech and Press
Clauses would somehow have entirely different meanings than their statelevel counterparts.

90. Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH.
U. L.Q. 371, 379–86. As Snee observes, “It is indeed stressing the obvious to conclude that, in
[Madison’s] mind at least, . . . the establishment of a religion by law is not per se an infringement
of the equal rights of conscience.” Id. at 384. I agree, although it seems possible that Madison
proposed the clause with awareness that he or others might use it as a basis for disestablishmentarian
arguments.
91. James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789) (“[N]atural rights, retained—
as Speech, Con[science.]”), in 12 T HE P APERS OF JAMES MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson &
Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979); Proposal by Roger Sherman to House Committee of Eleven (July
21–28, 1789) (“[C]ertain natural rights which are retained . . . [include] the right of conscience . . .
[and the right] of Speaking, writing and publishing . . . with decency and freedom . . . .”), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS : T HE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 66, at 83,
83.
92. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 567
(2006).
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II.

The Cabell Affair
Though originally unanticipated, partisan divisions emerged quickly in
the 1790s. By the time John Adams became President in 1797, a genuine
crisis had emerged. Federalists were convinced that their Republican
opponents were staging an American sequel to France’s disastrous
revolution. Meanwhile, Republicans saw themselves as the heirs of ‘76 and
the true voice of the people, with Federalists (in their view) busy
reestablishing ties with Great Britain and planning to inaugurate an American
monarchy.93
The ongoing European wars exacerbated these conflicts, and Federalists
often jumped at the chance to label their opponents as disloyal French
stooges. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1797, John Adams decried “the
pestilence of foreign influence, which is the angel of destruction to elective
governments.” 94 Just two months later, Adams delivered another rousing
speech urging Congress to prepare for war in response to French attacks on
American shipping. 95 “It must not be permitted to be doubted,” Adams stated,
“whether the people of the United States will support the government
established by their voluntary consent, and appointed by their free choice” or
surrender to “foreign and domestic factions, in opposition to their own
government.” 96
Republicans pleaded that Federalists had already succumbed to British
interests in the Jay Treaty. Particularly outspoken was Virginia Congressman
Samuel Jordan Cabell, who harangued Federalists in rambling yet colorful
public letters to his constituents. American capitulation to Britain and
belligerency toward France, he wrote in January 1797, was “sapping the
foundation of that illumined pyramid of liberty” and “thereby hastening with
a precipitancy and frantic rage only to be equalled by its depravity and
madness, the attainment of the darling wish of the aristocracy in this country,
the establishment of monarchy.” 97 Americans, he ominously declared, “are
furiously hurling ourselves into the vortex of tyranny.” 98 Cabell’s remarks

93. For discussions of the emerging political parties of the 1790s, see generally NOBLE E.
CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS: T HE FORMATION OF PARTY
ORGANIZATION, 1789-1801 (1957); S TANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MC KITRICK, THE AGE OF
FEDERALISM (1993); and S HARP, supra note 11.
94. John Adams, Inaugural Speech to Both Houses of Congress (Mar. 4, 1797), in 9 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 105, 109 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1854).
For French political meddling, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 93, at 341–65, 520–21.
95. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, T HE Q UASI-WAR : T HE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at 8–11 (1966).
96. John Adams, Speech to Both Houses of Congress (May 16, 1797), in 9 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 94, at 111, 118.
97. Circular Letter from Samuel Jordan Cabell (Jan. 12, 1797), in 1 CIRCULAR LETTERS OF
CONGRESSMEN TO T HEIR CONSTITUENTS 1789–1829, at 67, 69 (Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. ed.,
1978).
98. Id.
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were typical of 1790s politics, but they soon garnered attention in an unusual
forum: the federal circuit court in Richmond.
A. The Presentment
“The object” of a grand jury’s duties, Justice James Iredell announced
to the seventeen grand jurors assembled in Richmond on May 22, 1797, “is
the preservation of a union.” 99 Iredell, continuing a tradition of giving
political lectures in the form of jury charges, 100 echoed Adams’s complaints
about partisan conflict. “This country has great energies for defence, and by
supporting each other might defy the world,” he announced. “But if we
disunite, if we suffer differences of opinion to corrode into enmity, . . . we
must expect nothing but a fate as ruinous as it would be disgraceful, that of
inviting some foreign nation to foment and take advantage of our internal
discords.”101 Iredell concluded with an ominous warning: “So critical and
peculiar is our situation, that nothing can save us from this as well as every
other external danger, but constant vigilance.”102
The grand jury returned a presentment that took up Iredell’s provocative
invitation:
We of the grand Jury of the United States for the District of Virginia,
present as a real evil the circular Letters of several members of the late
Congress, and particularly Letters with the Signature of Samuel J.
Cabell, endeavouring at a time of real public danger, to disseminate
unfounded calumnies against the happy Government of the United
States, and thereby to separate the people therefrom, and to encrease
or produce a foreign influence ruinous to the peace, happiness and
independence of these United States.103
Newspapers soon published the presentment along with Iredell’s charge.104
The impact was electric. “The presentment going in the public papers just at
the moment when Congress was together,” Jefferson wrote to Madison,
“produced a great effect both on its friends and foes in that body, very much
to the disheartening and mortification of the latter.” 105
99. James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland
(May 8, 1797) [hereinafter James Iredell’s Charge], in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 173, 177. Iredell’s
Richmond charge included minor revisions but none pertinent to this part of his charge. See id. at
173 nn.1–7 (noting the differences).
100. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE S UPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: T HE C HIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 126–29 (1995) (providing examples).
101. James Iredell’s Charge, supra note 99, at 177.
102. Id.
103. Presentment of the Grand Jury, supra note 1, at 181.
104. VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), May 24, 1797, at 3.
105. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1797), in 29 THE P APERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 489, 490 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2002); see also, e.g., A Virginian, From the
Virginia Argus, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), June 21, 1797, at 3 (“I do not remember that
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Many scholars have mistakenly characterized the episode as “an
abortive attempt to try Congressman Samuel J. Cabell of Virginia for
seditious libel.” 106 The grand jury, however, had issued a “grievance
presentment”—a type of censure, common in the South, that did not initiate
criminal proceedings. 107 The following year, for instance, a grand jury in
Charleston “present[ed] as a grievance of the most dangerous nature to the
community . . . that such a number of dogs are allowed to go about the streets,
at present, when canine madness is so very prevalent in the city.” 108 The
Cabell presentment, too, pointed to “a real evil,” not a crime.109

my astonishment has been so greatly excited as it was the other day at reading a presentment, by the
grand jury to the federal court.”). Jefferson’s use of “it’s” as a possessive pronoun—common at that
time—is edited here for clarity.
106. LEVY, LEGACY OF S UPPRESSION, supra note 49, at 241; accord BLUMBERG, supra note
8, at 74 (“The grand jury without dissent promptly returned a presentment charging Cabell with
criminal libel . . . .” (footnote omitted)); JOSHUA A. CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW:
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 88 (2007) (“Samuel J. Cabell . . . was charged with seditious libel”); D AVID N.
MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL T HOUGHT OF T HOMAS JEFFERSON 199 (1994) (“[A] federal grand
jury had returned a presentment, or formal accusation of crime, against Samuel J. Cabell . . . for
seditious libel . . . .”); NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE L AW OF L IBEL 77 (1986) (“[G]rand jurors returned an indictment . . . against
Congressman Samuel J. Cabell of Virginia for criminal libel.”); JAMES MORTON SMITH,
FREEDOM’S FETTERS: T HE ALIEN AND SEDITION L AWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL L IBERTIES 95
(1956) (“[T]he federal grand jury at Richmond, Virginia, handed down a presentment which
denounced the Republican representative from Albemarle district . . . .”). Several scholars have
properly regarded the presentment as distinct from a formal charge. E.g., Koch & Ammon, supra
note 6, at 152–53. The most thorough summary of the Cabell affair appears in Brent Tarter & Wythe
Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand Juries in Virginia, 1789-1809, 49 AM. J.
LEGAL H IST. 257, 266–74 (2007).
107. See Sally E. Hadden, South Carolina’s Grand Jury Presentments: The Eighteenth-Century
Experience (explaining the difference between indictments and presentments), in SIGNPOSTS: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEGAL H ISTORY 89, 89 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds.,
2013); Renée B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1338
(1994) (same). Some grievance presentments protested the Sedition Act. See Douglas Bradburn, A
Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565,
582 (2008) (discussing a Tennessee presentment).
108. CITY GAZETTE & D AILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, S.C.), Jan. 27, 1798, at 2. Grievance
presentments were commonplace. See, e.g., Presentment of the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for
the District of Virginia (May 23, 1794) (expressing a “national Grievanc[e]” over debts owed to
Britain), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES,
1789-1800, at 472, 472 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988).
109. Contemporaries widely understood the Cabell presentment as grievance presentment
rather than as a formal indictment. See, e.g., Samuel Jordan Cabell, Letter, AURORA GEN.
ADVERTISER (Phila.), May 31, 1797 (“They do not complain of violations of any law . . . but they
complain of opinions . . . .”), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 183, 183–84; Anonymous Correspondent,
Letter, PHILA. GAZETTE, June 16, 1797 (“When judges and juries, whose province is rigid justice
under the law, quit that solid ground for the wide field of opinion, they may thereby become political
engines . . . .”), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 199, 200; Letter from Henry Tazewell to [John Page?]
(June 3, 1797) (“If the writers had violated the Laws, the Court and Jury knew that the Culprits and
not their opinions were the fit subjects for animadversion.”), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF
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Still, Republicans were livid. Federal judges, Cabell complained, had
“become a band of political preachers, instead of a sage body to administer
the law.” 110 In a public letter addressed to Iredell, an anonymous author—
perhaps a young Henry Clay—alleged that “by not directing the attorney for
the United States to prosecute, you tacitly admitted that the presentment was
improper.”111 He excoriated Iredell for “endeavour[ing] to regulate the degree
of heat” of political discussions. “You offer yourself as a political
thermometer for the use of the Virginians! But I fear, sir, that the mercury of
your political composition, will never rise to the temperature of
manliness.” 112
Republican responses to the Cabell presentment flowed from their
earlier defense of Democratic-Republican societies in the wake of the socalled Whiskey Rebellion. Federalists, horrified by the blatant disregard for
federal law in the West, had pinned the blame on “certain self-created
societies,” commonly known now as Democratic-Republican societies.113
Federalists in Congress sought a resolution condemning the societies for
calumnies that, in their view, had excited the insurrection. 114 In response,
congressional Republicans “exploded in wrath.”115 “The law is the only rule

S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 189, 189. The claim
that “the grand jury quickly withdrew its presentment,” Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate,
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1142 (1973), is
mistaken.
110. Cabell, supra note 109, at 183.
111. Scaevola, To James Iredell, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 11,
1797, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 192, 194. Clay, who lived in Richmond until November 1797,
used the pseudonym Scaevola the following year in Kentucky. 1 CALVIN COLTON, THE L IFE AND
TIMES OF HENRY CLAY 29, 187 (N.Y.C., A.S. Barnes & Co. 1846). Clay was involved in opposition
to the Sedition Act in Kentucky. Bradburn, supra note 107, at 567–68.
112. Scaevola, supra note 111, at 192. Iredell responded in a Richmond newspaper, explaining
that “it has been a frequent practice in some of the southern states for grand juries to present what
they considered as grievances though they could not be the foundation of a criminal prosecution.”
James Iredell Letter, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 21, 1797, reprinted in
3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800,
supra note 1, at 201, 202.
113. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate and House of
Representatives (Nov. 19, 1794) (“In the four western Counties of Pennsylvania a prejudice . . .
produced symptoms of riot and violence. . . . [C]ertain self-created societies assumed the tone of
condemnation.”), in 17 THE P APERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 181, 181
(David R. Hoth & Carol S. Ebel eds., 2013); Letter from the United States Senate to George
Washington (Nov. 22, 1794) (“Our anxiety, arising from the licentious & open resistance to the
laws, in the western counties of Pennsylvania, has been increased, by the proceedings of certain
self-created societies . . . .”), in 17 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES,
supra, at 198, 198.
114. Philip S. Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies: An Introduction, in THE
DEMOCRATIC -REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK OF
CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESSES, RESOLUTIONS, AND TOASTS 3, 31 (Philip S. Foner
ed., 1976).
115. DAVID P. CURRIE, T HE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD
THE
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of right,” James Madison insisted, and “what is consistent with that, is not
punishable; what is not contrary to that, is innocent, or at least not censurable
by the Legislative body.”116 With rhetorical flair, Madison explained: “If we
advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
Government over the people.” 117
The Cabell affair brought back to the fore Republicans’ concerns over
the lawless nature of public censures. “If these letters contained calumnies
that were illegal—If they produced, or increased a foreign influence in our
country contrary to law,” Cabell himself posited, “the authors were fit
subjects for a presentment and for punishment.” 118 But, he explained, only
false statements of fact—not opinion—could support criminal charges. 119
Virginia Senator Henry Tazewell agreed. “Having presented the Letters and
not the writers,” he explained, “they shew that the writers were no further
censureable than for their political opinions. Thus have a Court and Jury
erected themselves into a tribunal of political Censors.”120 Although
Republicans frequently invoked speech and press freedoms, 121 their
arguments were directed at the lawless nature of the presentment rather than
a lack of federal power over speech. 122 Recall that “the very essence of civil
1789–1801, at 190 (1997). The vehemence of Republican opposition perhaps stemmed from a fear
that Congress might later invoke legislative privileges to punish critics of the government.
116. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 935 (1794) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
117. Id. at 934; see also id. at 917–18 (statement of Rep. William Giles) (making similar
points).
118. Cabell, supra note 109, at 183.
119. Id. at 184 (“If I have written falsely with a view to deceive my countrymen, why did not
this enlightened jury state the facts which I have misrepresented?”).
120. Letter from Henry Tazewell to [John Page?], supra note 109, at 189; see also Marius, To
Jugurtha, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 24, 1797 (“I doubt . . . whether a
judicial body of men have a right to brand with infamy, the expression of . . . political
sentiments . . . . If they do not punish them because they are without their jurisdiction, neither can
they take cognizance of political opinions, which the law has not expressly placed within it.”),
reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES,
1789-1800, supra note 1, at 203, 203–04; Scaevola, supra note 111, at 194 (“If the conduct for
which mr. Cabell was presented was criminal, the court should have directed a prosecution . . . .”).
121. E.g., Circular Letter from Anthony New (June 17, 1797), in 1 CIRCULAR LETTERS OF
CONGRESSMEN TO T HEIR CONSTITUENTS 1789–1829, supra note 97, at 91, 91; Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Peregrine Fitzhugh (June 4, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF T HOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 105, at 415, 417. Perhaps even more commonly, Republicans invoked freedom of opinion.
E.g., Marius, supra note 120, at 205; Circular Letter from John Clopton (June 19, 1797), in 1
CIRCULAR LETTERS OF CONGRESSMEN TO T HEIR CONSTITUENTS 1789–1829, supra note 97, at 94,
94. Federalists sometimes rejected an absolute privilege to express opinions, making clear the
natural-rights basis of the idea. See A Virginian, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Bos.), June 24, 1797
(“Freedom of opinion is certainly an inherent privilege.—So is freedom of action.—But murder is
to be punished by death. And although Grand Jurors are not lawmakers, yet they are its guardians,
and it is their peculiar province to stop sedition . . . .”), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 205, 205.
122. Federalists responded that the grand jurors were merely presenting their opinion of
Cabell’s letters, leaving Cabell and others free to express their views as well. E.g., A Friend to
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liberty” in the eighteenth century focused on the existence of prospective,
generally applicable laws.123
Alongside these old concerns about lawless political censorship, a new
fear arose among Republicans from the Cabell affair: jury composition.
“Look at the names,” Cabell wrote, pointing to the presence of several
foreigners on the grand jury. 124 Republicans worried about the jurors’
partisanship as well. According to the scurrilous Republican editor James
Callender, who was later prosecuted under the Sedition Act, Cabell
apparently claimed that “four fifths of the whole band consisted of pardoned
tories, and of republicans imported from Scotland.” 125 Tazewell also
highlighted the jury’s membership, remarking that several jurors he was “not
astonished at,” meaning they were known Federalist partisans. 126
Indeed, the members of the grand jury were a powerful and wellconnected group.127 The foreman, John Blair, was a former Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Joining him were a Federalist member of the
Virginia House of Delegates, 128 four former delegates,129 six merchants,130
and several county clerks. 131 Familial relationships abounded, too. One of the

Juries, Letter to Samuel Jordan Cabell, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 30,
1797, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 207, 208–09; Timothy Tickle, Letter to Samuel Jordan Cabell,
VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), July 5, 1797, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 213, 215–
16.
123. HAMILTON, supra note 60, at 100.
124. Cabell, supra note 109, at 184.
125. 1 JAMES T. CALLENDER, THE PROSPECT BEFORE US 20 (Richmond, M. Jones, S.
Pleasants, Jr. & J. Lyon 1800).
126. Letter from Henry Tazewell to [John Page?], supra note 109, at 189.
127. See Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (May 25, 1797) (describing the Grand Jury
as “composed of many of the most respectable Men in the State”), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 182, 182.
128. Robert Pollard was a Federalist member of the House of Delegates from King William
County, where he also was clerk of court for many years.
129. Former delegates were Corbin Griffin, Edward Hack Moseley, Thomas Newton, and
Thomas Tinsley.
130. Merchants included Robert Burton and Andrew Donald, who were members of expansive
Scottish mercantile networks centered around Glasgow; Thomas Thompson, who was a native of
Ireland and worked as a wine merchant in Madiera; Richard Randolph; William Vannerson; and
Thomas Newton of Norfolk.
131. Former clerks included Otway Byrd, Edward Hack Moseley, and Thomas Griffin Peachy.
Joseph Selden, one of the few Republicans on the grand jury, was a judge in Richmond and later
represented Henrico County in the House of Delegates. In 1802, Selden heard a libel complaint
against publisher James Thompson Callender. Unlike the other three Republican magistrates,
Selden ruled in favor of Callender, deciding “it improper that such a restraint should be laid on the
press.” ALBANY GAZETTE, Jan. 17, 1803. This story apparently was reprinted from the Virginia
Gazette.
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grand jurors was the brother of the federal marshal, 132 while another was the
brother of Cyrus Griffin—one of the presiding judges. 133
The prominence of these men was no fluke. Virginia, although the
country’s most populous state, had a small and interconnected group of
affluent men who held most positions of public trust. 134 And the federal
marshal hand selected grand jurors from among this venerable group. 135
In the late 1780s, political elites had viewed the hand selection of jurors
as a way of safeguarding rights. As one of the architects of the Judiciary Act,
Oliver Ellsworth, put it, “a very ignorant Jury might be drawn by Ballot,” and
parochial jurors might be inclined against defending property rights. 136 Hand
selection ensured that jurors would be men of sound judgment. “Care may be
taken in the manner of forming the delegated body,” James Wilson explained
in his law lectures. 137 Although Federalists uniformly endorsed the need for
representative institutions, they did not think that representative bodies had
to reflect a cross-section of the society. 138 Rather, a “very guarded selection”
of jurors, Wilson observed, could be accomplished “by an officer,

132. Richard Randolph was the brother of David Meade Randolph.
133. Corbin Griffin was the brother of Cyrus Griffin. Other jurors were related to each other.
Andrew Donald was the brother-in-law of fellow juror Callohill Mennis. Richard Randolph was
married to Maria Beverley—a first cousin of Otway Byrd’s wife and a niece of Thomas Griffin
Peachy’s wife. Peachy was first cousin of Corbin Griffin, his son had married John Blair’s niece,
and he was related to Otway Byrd and Robert Pollard through his wife’s family.
134. See, e.g., ALBERT H. TILLSON, JR., GENTRY AND COMMON FOLK: POLITICAL C ULTURE
ON A VIRGINIA FRONTIER 1740–1789, at 18 (1991) (“A small circle of elite families dominated
most Virginia counties in the eighteenth century . . . .”).
135. The Judiciary Act instructed federal marshals to summon jurors “designated by lot or
otherwise in each State respectively according to the mode of forming juries therein now practised,
so far as the laws of the same shall render such designation practicable by the courts or marshals of
the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88. The Act further provided that
federal jurors in each state had to have the same qualifications as required for jury service “in the
highest courts of law of such State.” Id. In six of the original eleven states—Delaware, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, plus Kentucky and Vermont—this meant that
federal marshals hand selected jurors. Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury
and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1054 (2007); Juror
Reform Bills of 1800, supra note 6, at 271.
136. Letter from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9–10, 1789) (reporting
Ellsworth’s remarks), in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 6, at 496, 499; see also id. (“[State] Juries were too apt to be biassed
ag[ain]st [foreigners], in favor of their own citizens & acquaintances . . . .”). Whigs had a
longstanding complaint against the return of “Corrupt and Unqualifyed Persons” to serve on juries,
including men who “were not Freeholders.” An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the
Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, § 9 (Eng.) [hereinafter
English Bill of Rights].
137. WILSON, supra note 32, at 961. Robert Jones provocatively describes the federal selection
of jurors as the primary impetus for federal diversity jurisdiction. See Jones, supra note 135, at 1005
(“[F]ederal officials could judiciously exercise their control over federal jury compositions to ensure
that only the ‘better sort’ of Americans would decide cases in the federal courts.”).
138. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 495–
99 (1969).
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confidential, impartial, and, by the people themselves, appointed for this very
purpose” without undercutting the jury’s representative role. 139
Partisanship was not yet a concern in the late 1780s. To be sure, some
people expected that federal judges would be loyal supporters of the
Washington administration, 140 and countless Anti-Federalists worried about
the ability of the federal government to change the venue of trials as a way of
undercutting the jury right. 141 Alexander Hamilton even acknowledged in
Federalist No. 83 that the hand selection of jurors made judicial proceedings
“more accessible to the touch of corruption.” 142 But the Founders—in
perhaps their greatest oversight—did not appreciate that the affinities of the
people would soon fragment along partisan lines.
By the late 1790s, however, jury selection by a presidential appointee
presented obvious partiality concerns. Virginia’s federal marshal, David
Meade Randolph, was an ardent Federalist who exhibited notable patterns in
his juror picks. A recent study of federal grand juries in Richmond from 1789
to 1809 found that “[e]very grand jury included several men who were or
recently had been members of Virginia’s General Assembly or of Congress,
and more than a few served prominently in one or the other legislative body
or as governor after they were on the grand jury.” 143 And their political views,
unsurprisingly, tended to mirror those of the Administration. 144 On the
Richmond jury in 1797, for instance, eight of the seventeen jurors are known
to have been Federalists,145 and five of the remaining nine were merchants,146
a group that typically supported the Adams Administration. And Republicans
knew it. No wonder they were so worried.

139. WILSON, supra note 32, at 961.
140. See PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 14, 1787 (expressing fears of a “partial and
interested FEDERAL COURT”), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 459, 459.
141. Some Anti-Federalists emphasized the importance of a local jury to fact-finding given the
familiarity of local juries with the characters of the witnesses and parties. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE,
THE J URY: T HE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 27–28 (1994). But, as Abramson
trenchantly observes, “The jury served freedom not only by getting the facts right but also by getting
the people right. Local citizens were empowered to control the actual administration of justice.” Id.
at 28.
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 19, at 564 (Alexander Hamilton).
143. Tarter & Holt, supra note 106, at 263.
144. Id. at 283. Federalists in Virginia usually were not partisan firebrands, at least compared
to their northern counterparts, but they responded to Federalist calls for order. RICHARD R. BEEMAN,
THE O LD DOMINION AND THE NEW N ATION, 1788-1801, at 156–58 (1972).
145. Those eight were John Blair, Otway Byrd, Corbin Griffin, Calohill Minnis, Thomas
Griffin Peachy, Robert Pollard, Richard Randolph, and Thomas Tinsley.
146. Those five were Robert Burton, Andrew Donald, Thomas Newton, Thomas Thompson,
and William Vannerson. Richard Randolph was a merchant but was also a known Federalist.

CAMPBELL.P RINTING (DO NOT DELETE)

548

2/14/2019 11:28 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:517

B. The Jeffersonian Response
Editorials about the Cabell presentment continued to appear in Virginia
newspapers through late July, 147 but the most interesting response came from
Thomas Jefferson, who was then serving as Vice President. By early August,
Jefferson had completed a draft petition that he planned to submit
anonymously to the Virginia General Assembly through one of his friends. 148
The draft reveals two significant developments in Jefferson’s thinking.
First, the draft portrayed the federal grand jury as an arm of the
government, not as a representative body of the people. “[T]he Grand jury is
a part of the Judiciary,” Jefferson wrote, and an effort by the judiciary to
“interpose” on the “free correspondence” between representatives and their
constituents was “to put the legislative department under the feet of the
Judiciary.” 149 This subordination was “more vitally dangerous,” he
explained, “when it is considered that Grand jurors are selected by officers
appointed and holding their places at the will of the Executive, that they are
exposed to influence from the judges who are appointed immediately by the
Executive.”150
Second, Jefferson’s draft focused on the presentment’s utter
lawlessness—not simply its error—thus opening the door to drastic
countermeasures. Grand juries, he argued, were constrained by “known
limits . . . to make presentment of those acts of individuals which the laws
have declared to be crimes or misdemeanors.”151 The grand jurors’
“depart[ure] out of the legal limits of their said office,” he concluded, meant
that they had “avail[ed] themselves of the sanction of its cover.”152 For well
over one hundred years, jurors in England and the colonies had been immune
from civil or criminal penalties. 153 But by acting beyond their authority,
Jefferson asserted, the federal grand jurors made themselves subject to
punishment by the state assembly, even for offenses that “escape the
definitions of the law.” 154

147. See, for instance, several letters in the Virginia Gazette, and General Advertiser
(Richmond), July 26, 1797.
148. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 105, at 490.
149. Thomas Jefferson, Draft Petition to the Virginia House of Delegates (Aug. 3, 1797), in 29
THE P APERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 493, 495.
150. Id. at 496.
151. Id. at 495.
152. Id. The apostrophe in the possessive pronoun “it’s” has been removed for clarity.
153. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 426–27 (2009)
(identifying Bushell’s Case, a 1670 English decision, as establishing juror immunity).
154. Jefferson, supra note 149, at 496. Formally, Jefferson proposed that the General Assembly
punish the grand jurors through impeachment. John Page also mentioned impeachment shortly after
learning of Cabell’s presentment. See Letter from John Page to St. George Tucker (June 14, 1797)
(“What think you of the late Presentment? I confess I feel almost disposed to impeach the Judge &
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Jefferson sent his proposal to James Madison and James Monroe, who
each returned with tepid replies. 155 Monroe wondered “whether it would not
be better to address it to the Congress?”156 In response, Jefferson admitted
that doubts “as to [Virginia’s] jurisdiction” had occurred to him, too, but that
sending a petition to the House of Representatives “would make bad worse,
that a majority of that house would pass a vote of approbation.” 157 Jefferson
was in a bind. His argument focused on federal wrongs, but he knew that
petitioning Congress would be counterproductive.
An intellectual breakthrough came in his second draft. Jefferson began
with the same argument, explaining how the grand jury had exceeded its
authority. This time, however, he added that “independently of these
considerations of a constitutional nature, the right of free correspondence
between citizen and citizen on their joint interests, public or private, and
under whatsoever laws these interests arise, is a natural right of every
individual citizen, not the gift of municipal law.”158 All Founders would have
agreed that retained natural rights preexisted constitutional formation, but
Jefferson used this idea in a novel way. The right to the freedom of
communication, he contended, was simply not a federal concern, and state
control over the retained liberty of speech called for state remedies when that
freedom was abridged. “[T]he right of free correspondence is not claimed
under that [federal] constitution nor the laws or treaties derived from it,” he
wrote, “but as a natural right, placed originally under the protection of our
municipal laws, and retained under the cognizance of our own courts.” 159
Here we see the origins of a new understanding of the First Amendment.
In his draft petition, Jefferson did not explain why the protection of natural
rights was a uniquely state-based concern. But by contending that “the right
of free correspondence is not claimed under that [federal] constitution,”
Jefferson cast the First Amendment as not guaranteeing speech and press
rights as federal rights. Apparently the Speech Clause gave the federal
government no role to play in defending the freedom of speech, even against
federal encroachment. Jefferson was not yet explicitly denying federal

his Grd Jury!!!”), in 3 T HE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 190, 190 n.2.
155. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 5, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 505, 505; Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson
(Sept. 5, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 524, 524.
156. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 155, at 524.
157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Sept. 7, 1797), in 29 THE P APERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 526, 526.
158. Thomas Jefferson, Revised Petition to the House of Delegates (Aug. 7–Sept. 7, 1797), in
29 THE P APERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 499, 502.
159. Id.; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, supra note 157, at 526
(“[T]his right of free correspondence . . . has not been given to us under 1st. the federal constitution,
2dly. any law of Congress, or 3dly. any treaty, but as before observed, by nature. It is therefore not
alienated, but remains under the protection of [states’] courts.”).
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authority to control speech, but his argument pointed clearly in that direction.
The evolution of Jefferson’s drafts indicates that he developed new ideas
in response to the particular challenge posed by the Cabell affair. Jefferson
faced a practical problem—an intractable Congress—and he shaped a
fascinating and innovative theory to meet that challenge. His desired remedy
drove the analysis.
As all creative thinkers do, Jefferson tapped into earlier strands of his
constitutional thought. During the controversy over religious assessments in
Virginia, for instance, he began with a widely accepted view that “the
opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its
jurisdiction,” 160 signifying that the government could not punish people
because of their thoughts. More controversially, Jefferson then argued that
the freedom of religious conscience barred public interference with religious
matters at all, even in the form of governmental support for religion through
taxation.161 As noted earlier, this idea was highly creative, and probably not
widely accepted.162 For present purposes, however, the key point is that
Jefferson’s claim was about state-level support for religion; it had nothing to
do with a unique definition of federal rights.
During the ratification debates, Jefferson again made statements that
could be read as denials of governmental power over certain natural rights.
“There are rights which it is useless to surrender to the government, and
which yet, governments have always been fond to invade,” he wrote to a
correspondent in 1789. 163 “These are,” he continued, “the rights of thinking,
and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing: the right of free
commerce: the right of personal freedom.” 164 Understood contextually,
however, Jefferson was not insisting that all governments lacked authority to
limit expression, commerce, or freedom. Natural rights, in Jefferson’s view,
were limited not only by a principle against harming others but also by certain
social duties.165 The freedom of expression, for instance, easily comported
160. Jefferson, supra note 86, at 546. Critics of Jefferson’s position accepted this premise. See
An Eastern Layman, To The Publick, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), Aug. 14, 1779, at 1 (“That the
opinions of men are not the objects of civil government, is a dogma, to which every rational mind
must necessarily accede . . . .”); see also, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep.
James Madison) (“Opinions are not the objects of legislation.”); A Landholder [Oliver Ellsworth],
Letter VII to the Landholders and Farmers, CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Dec. 17, 1787 (“Civil
government has no business to meddle with the private opinions of the people.”), reprinted in 14
THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 448,
451.
161. See Jefferson, supra note 86, at 546 (“[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . . . .”).
162. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
163. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 74, at 676, 678.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802),
in 36 THE P APERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 258, 258 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2009) (“I shall see with
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with “liability of the printers for false facts printed.”166 In any event,
Jefferson’s discussions of federal rights in the late 1780s again offer no
indication that those rights would have different meanings at the federal and
state levels. His innovative move toward such a theory in 1797 was genuinely
novel, responding to a problem that simply had not existed a decade earlier.
The House of Delegates debated Jefferson’s petition in late December
1797.167 In the end, the delegates approved resolutions that chastised the
grand jury for its “political criminality,” but they decided not to pursue
impeachment. The resolutions concluded:
That it ought therefore to be solemnly declared by the House of
Delegates, that the said presentment is a violation of the fundamental
principles of representation, incompatible with that independence
between the co-ordinate branches of government, mediated both by
the general and state constitutions: an usurpation of power not
confided to one branch over another by any rule, legal or
constitutional; and a subjection of the natural right of speaking and
writing freely, to the censure and controul of Executive power.168
The Virginia House of Delegates thus embraced Jefferson’s view of juries as
arms of the government—a remarkable development attributable to
Republican concerns about jury selection. No longer were juries, as Jefferson
had heroically described in 1789, “the firmest bulwarks of English liberty.”169
III. The Sedition Act
Acrimonious partisanship escalated even further in 1798. In April,
Jefferson informed Madison that “one of the war-party, in a fit of unguarded
passion declared some time ago they would pass a citizen bill, an alien bill,
& a sedition bill.” 170 The object of a sedition bill, he presciently explained,
would be “the suppression of the whig presses.” 171 Sure enough, in late June
federal officers arrested Benjamin Franklin Bache—the irascible editor of the
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural
rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.”).
166. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE P APERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
167. VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at 1.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbé Arnoux, supra note 34, at 282, 283. Federalists
protested Republican attacks on the jury, arguing that “legislative interferences with this sacred
political institution tend to discredit the same, and by impairing its weight and influence, evidently
promote the cause of despotism.” VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at
2. But to no avail; the delegates overwhelmingly voted down Federalist proposals. Id. In a rarely
mentioned epilogue, the Virginia Senate excoriated the House for passing resolutions on behalf of
the people “without the participation of the Senate.” VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER
(Richmond), Jan. 10, 1798, at 2.
170. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 26, 1798), in 30 THE P APERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 299, 299 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003).
171. Id. at 300.
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most prominent Republican newspaper—on common law sedition charges,
and less than a month later the Federalist majority in Congress passed a
sedition law.
A. Congressional Debates
The Federalist argument for a Sedition Act was straightforward:
Congress had an obligation to preserve the government. Seditious
publications, Federalists insisted, were “approaches to revolution and
Jacobinic domination.”172 Connecticut Representative John Allen put the
point vividly: “[T]he liberty of vomiting . . . floods of falsehood and hatred”
would produce effects already seen “across the water; it has there made slaves
of thirty millions of men.”173 Indeed, the specter of revolutionary France
loomed over the debates, not simply as a foreign threat but also as a
forewarning of what might happen domestically if licentiousness reined free.
As Kathryn Preyer cautions, “Only present-mindedness or lack of
imagination leads us to dismiss casually such fears as paranoia.”174
Relying on prevailing understandings of speech and press freedoms,
Federalists had no trouble explaining the consistency of the Sedition Act with
the First Amendment. “The terms ‘freedom of speech and of the press,’”
Harrison Gray Otis explained, “were a phraseology perfectly familiar in the
jurisprudence of every State, and of a certain and technical meaning . . .
borrowed from the only country in which it had been tolerated.”175 That
freedom, he continued,
is nothing more than the liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking,
one’s thoughts, under the condition of being answerable to the injured
party, whether it be the Government or an individual, for false,
malicious, and seditious expressions, whether spoken or written; and
the liberty of the press is merely an exemption from all previous
restraints.176
172. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2098 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Allen).
173. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 2146 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis) (“[E]very independent
Government has a right to preserve and defend itself against injuries and outrages which endanger
its existence . . . .”); id. at 2133 (statement of Rep. George Thatcher) (drawing an analogy to a
federal law against threatening federal officials). Federalists described as “absurd” the view that the
federal government might be “indebted to and dependent on an individual State for its protection.”
Id. at 2146 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis). Notably, Federalists had already sketched out
the basis for a possible sedition law in the 1794 congressional debates over Democratic-Republican
societies. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 937 (1794) (statement of Rep. Samuel Dexter) (“[W]hen [speech
and press] were so abused as to become hostile to liberty, and threaten her destruction, the abuses
ought to be corrected . . . . [H]e did not doubt the right to forbid such flagrant outrages on social
order, and all arts tending to produce them.”).
174. Preyer, supra note 6, at 187. For a nuanced and penetrating review of Federalist thought,
see generally Marc Lendler, “Equally Proper at All Times and at All Times Necessary”: Civility,
Bad Tendency, and the Sedition Act, 24 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 419 (2004).
175. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2147 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis).
176. Id. at 2148.
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Otis’s comment reflects an important point that scholars often overlook:
Many Federalists viewed the liberty of the press as simply a rule against prior
restraints,177 but they described the freedom of speech in a more capacious
manner, embracing a liberty of well-intentioned, noninjurious speaking,
writing, and publishing. 178
Harmful speech, however, was an entirely different matter. “Because I
have the liberty of locomotion, of going where I please,” John Allen asked,
“have I a right to ride over the footman in the path?” Extending this idea,
Allen explained: “The freedom of the press and opinions was never
understood to give the right of publishing falsehoods and slanders, nor of
exciting sedition, insurrection, and slaughter, with impunity.”179 Other
Federalists echoed this theme. 180 The sedition bill did not restrain “a free
animadversion upon the proceedings of Congress, or the conduct of its
members; it merely prohibits calumny and deception,” Harrison Gray Otis
remarked.181 And “an honest jury” could distinguish the two by “decid[ing]
upon the falsehood and malice of the intention.” 182 Indeed, the Sedition Act
explicitly recognized the availability of a truth defense and gave juries the
power to render a general verdict. 183 Thus, Otis insisted, the people “were

177. See id. at 2102 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper) (defining the “true meaning”
of “the liberty of the Press” as “no more than that a man shall be at liberty to print what he pleases,
provided he does not offend against the laws”).
178. The treatment of the Federalist understanding of the First Amendment as merely a rule
against prior restraints is common in the literature. See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of
Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2167, 2180 & n.51 (2015) (citing Otis for the principle that
a “[no-prior-restraint] view of the freedom of speech and press had been propagated by some
supporters of the Sedition Act of 1798”); Lendler, supra note 174, at 426 n.28 (“[I]t is clear that the
Federalists thought the First Amendment meant ‘no prior restraint.’”). But Otis and other Federalists
referred to that rule when expounding the liberty of the press, not the freedom of speech (or, as Otis
put it, the “liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking”).
179. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 2098 (1798) (remarks of Rep. John Allen); see also id. at 2112
(remarks of Rep. Samuel Dana) (“Is [speech and press freedom] a license to injure others or the
Government, by calumnies, with impunity? . . . Can it be anything more than the right of uttering
and doing what is not injurious to others?”).
180. E.g., id. at 2167 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper); id. at 2150 (statement of Rep.
Harrison Gray Otis); id. at 2102 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper).
181. Id. at 2150 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also, e.g., id. at 2156 (statement of
Rep. Samuel Dana) (“[N]o honest man wanted the liberty of uttering malicious falsehood—and this
law would operate against no other publications.”).
182. Id. at 2149 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also id. at 2168 (statement of Rep.
Robert Goodloe Harper) (echoing these comments about the role of juries in determining falsity and
malice).
183. The Senate bill did not mention a truth defense, but Federalists may have viewed the idea
as implicit “from the construction of the bill itself.” Id. at 2134 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe
Harper). Congressional debates reflect wide agreement that juries should be permitted to serve as
“judges of the law as well as the fact,” id. at 2135; id. (statement of Rep. William Claiborne),
meaning they would have “a power of returning a [general] verdict of guilty, or not guilty,” id.
(statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also id. at 2136 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin)
(describing the common law principle that “a jury in criminal cases were judges not only of the fact,
but also of the criminality of that fact”); id. (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Smith) (“[T]here can be
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still at liberty, and would ever be so, to use their tongues and their pens, like
all other property, so as to do no wanton and unjustifiable injury to others.”184
Republicans lobbed a slew of arguments in reply. 185 To justify
“restraints on the liberty of speech and of the press,” Albert Gallatin
explained, “it was at least necessary to prove the existence of a seditious
disposition amongst the people.”186 Yet Federalists had failed, he insisted, in
showing the “absolute necessity” that Republicans typically demanded of
laws passed pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. 187 Republicans
further denied that Congress had authority to “provide for the punishment of
any offences against Government” other than those specifically
enumerated,188 unless a “specific power . . . could not be carried into effect”
without the assistance of federal criminal law.189
The First Amendment—then still known as the “third amendment”—
featured prominently in Republican arguments. According to John Nicholas,
he had “looked in vain amongst the enumerated powers . . . for an authority
to pass a law like the present; but he found what he considered as an express
prohibition against passing it.” 190 Nicholas did not deny that false statements
had no value. “If there could be safety in adopting the principle, that no man
should publish what is false,” he explained, “there certainly could be no

no doubt but juries have already that power . . . .”). Among those who spoke up, only James Bayard
opposed giving power to juries to decide law, arguing that “a power of this kind is much more safely
lodged in the hands of learned and upright Judges, than it could possibly be in those of an unlettered
and perhaps prejudiced jury.” Id. (statement of Rep. James Bayard). Bayard worried that “the effect
of this amendment would be, to put it into the power of a jury to declare that this is an
unconstitutional law, instead of leaving this to be determined, where it ought to be determined, by
the Judiciary.” Id.
184. Id. at 2151 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also id. at 2168 (statement of Rep.
Robert Goodloe Harper) (“[N]or could he be persuaded that the liberty of the press, as understood
by the Constitution, could ever be abridged by a law to punish, on conviction before a jury, the
publication of false, scandalous, and malicious libels.”). In the so-called “Minority Report,”
Federalists in the Virginia Assembly, perhaps under the leadership of John Marshall, made similar
arguments. Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO S T. L.J. 435, 457–58 (2007).
185. Scholars often criticize the bill for not protecting Vice President Thomas Jefferson and for
its expiration at the end of the presidential term, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8, at 520; Mayton, supra
note 8, at 124, but congressional debates do not reveal Republican opposition to either of these
points, see, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2134, 2138 (1798) (reporting the votes on several amendments
to the bill); see also Lendler, supra note 174, at 420 (noting attempts to reauthorize the Act in 1801).
186. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2111 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
187. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 2159, 2161–62 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (emphasizing
the lack of necessity); id. at 2106 (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Macon) (arguing that the availability
of state libel prosecutions showed a lack of necessity for federal law).
188. Id. at 2158 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin); see also, e.g., id. at 2151–52 (statement of
Rep. Nathaniel Macon) (“They (Congress) have power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations; but they have no power to
define any other crime whatever.” (quoting James Iredell)).
189. Id. at 2159 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
190. Id. at 2139 (statement of Rep. John Nicholas).
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objection to it.” 191 What worried Nicholas, though, was the administration of
a sedition law. The “eye of a jealous Government,” he explained, would
“torture” critical statements “into an offence against this law.”192 And critics
would then “have to be tried by judges appointed by the President, and by
juries selected by the Marshal, who also receives his appointment from the
President, all whose feelings would, of course, be inclined to commit the
offender if possible.”193 The solution, for Nicholas, was a full denial of
federal authority. “On this account,” he insisted, “the General Government
has been forbidden to touch the press.”194
Edward Livingston made similar points. “Every man’s character is
protected by law, and every man who shall publish a libel on any part of the
Government, is liable to punishment,” Livingston explained. 195 But only state
authorities had that power. It was “much more probable,” he insisted, “that
justice will be found in a court in which neither of the parties have influence,
than in one which is wholly in the power of the President.”196 The problem,
in Livingston’s view, was straightforward. Federal judges were presidential
appointees, and the jury was “selected by an officer holding his office at the
will of the President.”197
Albert Gallatin concurred. “[A]lthough there might be no change made
by this bill in the law of libels,” he acknowledged, “there was an all-important
one made by the transfer of jurisdiction.” 198 Again, the crux of the problem
was jury selection. Federal marshals chose jurors in many states, Gallatin
observed, and each marshal was a “creature of the Executive.”199 The sheriff
charged with selecting jurors in Pennsylvania, by contrast, was elected to a
three-year term, making him an “officer of the people.” 200 This distinction
between state and federal jury-selection practices might be “immaterial . . .
in ordinary suits or prosecutions,” Gallatin admitted, but suits “of a political
nature” were entirely different. 201 In these cases, he explained, “the jury was
liable to be packed by the Administration.” 202
Leading Republicans in the House thus presented a unified attack on the
Sedition Act using a new theory of the First Amendment. The degree of
191. Id. at 2140.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2153 (statement of Rep. Edward Livingston).
196. Id. at 2154.
197. Id. at 2153.
198. Id. at 2163 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin); see also id. at 2159–60 (“The sense, in
which he and his friends understood this amendment, was that Congress could not pass any law to
punish any real or supposed abuse of the press.”).
199. Id. at 2164.
200. Id. at 2163–64.
201. Id. at 2164.
202. Id.
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coordination between Nicholas, Livingston, and Gallatin is unclear, nor do
we know how Jefferson may have influenced their strategy. 203 But the
harmony of their opposition is striking. All three men pointed to jury
selection when explaining why the federal government could not pass a
sedition law. Perhaps not coincidentally, these three Republicans—from
Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania—each came from a state where
federal marshals hand selected jurors and where most of the leading
Republican newspapers operated. Indeed, as it turned out, the bulk of
Sedition Act prosecutions were in states with hand selection of jurors.204
The Republican emphasis on federal power and jury selection reinforced
several of their recurring constitutional motifs. One was an emphasis on
constitutional limitations of federal power—a theme in Republican politics
throughout the 1790s. Another was a claim about unchecked executive
discretion. The principal Republican arguments against the 1798 Alien
Friends Act, for instance, were that Congress lacked authority to pass the bill
and that it gave the President too much control. With its emphasis on partisan
jury selection, Republican opposition to the Sedition Act played to both of
these themes.205
Provocatively, Republicans also invoked the longstanding principle that
no man may judge his own case, turning the earlier anti-corruption
justification for juries on its head. “If there could be safety in adopting the
principle, that no man should publish what is false,” John Nicholas explained
early on in the debates, “there certainly could be no objection to it,”206
accepting that expressive freedom did not require a categorical denial of
governmental power over speech. But, he cautioned, “the persons who would
have to preside in trials of this sort, would themselves be parties, or at least
they would be so far interested in the issue, that the trial of the truth or
falsehood of a matter would not be safe in their hands.” 207 And it was “[o]n

203. Jefferson was extraordinarily cautious in his correspondence at this time, DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF L IBERTY 319–20 (1962), and his presence in
Philadelphia until the eve of the Sedition Act debates in the House leaves unclear how he may have
personally shaped the Republican opposition at this time. Without success, I have reviewed the
papers of Albert Gallatin at the Library of Congress, the papers of Edward Livingston at Princeton,
and the papers of the Nicholas family at the University of Virginia.
204. Federalists prosecuted the editors of seven newspapers in hand-selection states—two in
Vermont, two in New York, two in Pennsylvania, and one in Virginia—and one each in the
selection-by-lot states of Massachusetts and Connecticut. BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 102–34.
Other confirmed prosecutions took place in Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont, again tilting
toward the hand-selection states. Id. at 134–39.
205. For Republican opposition to the Alien Friends Act, see generally, JOHN C. MILLER,
CRISIS IN FREEDOM: T HE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951). For continuity in Republican thought
about federalism, see generally, K.R. Constantine Gutzman, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
Reconsidered: “An Appeal to the Real Laws of Our Country”, 66 J.S. HIST. 473 (2000).
206. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Nicholas).
207. Id.
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this account,” Nicholas concluded, that “the General Government has been
forbidden to touch the press.” 208
Congressional Republicans occasionally hinted at a broader
understanding of speech and press freedoms without relying on federalism. 209
But these arguments were subject to a devastating Federalist response: states
had recognized the limited scope of speech and press freedoms by routinely
restricting expression. One state law barred “aiding in a lottery by printing or
publishing a scheme on account of it.” 210 Another imposed “heavy
penalt[ies]” on persons who “by public or private discourse or
conversation . . . should dissuade or endeavor to prevent an officer from
doing his duty in quelling riots.” 211 Virginia had passed a law “against cursing
and swearing, which,” as Harrison Gray Otis pointed out, “is merely using
the liberty of speech.” 212 Indeed, any number of crimes like forgery or bribery
could be “effected through the medium of the press or of the pen” or be “done
by words only.”213 In the face of these laws, the new theory offered
Republicans a way to deny federal authority to pass the Sedition Act without
condemning these sorts of uncontroversial state laws.
B. Republican Opposition
After the Sedition Act went into effect, Republicans maintained steady
attention on the issue of jury selection. “This power in a marshal, is a more
complete and severe check on the press, and the right of the people to remark
on public affairs,” Charles Pinckney declared, “than ten thousand sedition
laws, because here the power to select and by that means govern the opinion
of juries, is continual, always increasing, and in a great degree subject on
every trial to the wishes and directions of a President.” 214 In states where “the
federal marshals have a right to summon jurors as they please,” he implored,
“the people are not free.”215 Rather, justice in those states

208. Id.
209. See, e.g., id. at 2160 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (describing reliance on the
distinction between liberty and license as an “insulting evasion” of the Constitution). Gallatin
further argued that speech was not subject to “previous restraints” unless “the Constitution had given
Congress a power to seal the mouths or to cut the tongues of the citizens of the Union,” id., and
therefore “a Constitutional clause forbidding any abridgement of the freedom of speech must
necessarily mean, not that no laws should be passed laying previous restraints upon it, but that no
punishment should by law be inflicted upon it,” id. at 2160–61.
210. Id. at 2148 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2149.
213. Id. Federalists tried to reauthorize the Sedition Act in January 1801, leading to a reprisal
of the same arguments. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 916–40, 946–58, 960–76 (1801). Republicans again
highlighted jury selection as a principal concern. E.g., id. at 965 (statement of Rep. Nathaniel
Macon); id. at 951 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
214. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 40 (1800) (statement of Sen. Charles Pinckney).
215. Id. at 37.
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must depend not on the laws but the integrity and honest independence
of a marshal; to him is left the monstrous and dangerous power of
summoning proper or improper, fit or unfit, dishonest or upright
men—men who may be the friends or enemies to the parties who are
on their trial, or who on political questions may be known to be
opposed to them, and to hold opinions diametrically contrary to those
which are perhaps in the course of the trial to be submitted to them for
their decision.216
Fears of partisan jury selection and calls for reform were common themes in
other Republican writings. 217
Thomas Jefferson, too, began to consider ways of reforming juryselection practices. “[T]he people themselves are the safest deposit of
power . . . [and] are competent to the appointment or election of their agents,”
Jefferson wrote in a petition drafted in October 1798. 218 Appointment of
jurors, however, “has not been left in their hands, but has been placed by law
in officers, dependant on the Executive or Judiciary bodies.”219 In place of
this system, Jefferson proposed that Virginians elect a list of federal jurors,
with panels of grand and petit jurors chosen randomly from that list.220 This
method would strip control from federal marshals without, in turn,
empowering federal judges by creating juries “pliable to the will and designs
of power.”221
While Jefferson was contemplating jury selection, he was also preparing
a draft resolution that he called “the Kentuckey resolves,”222 now commonly
known as the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.223 The draft took an

216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Virginia Assembly Debates (Dec. 19, 1798) (statement of Del. William Daniel)
(warning of “a jury summoned with a special regard to their political opinions”), in DEBATES IN
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 35, at 99; AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.),
Nov. 7, 1799, at 3 (“How could such a President secure the conviction of those men? By influencing
marshals to pack juries, to select men who should be devoted to his interest.”); AURORA GEN.
ADVERTISER (Phila.), May 20, 1799, at 2 (“The Grand Jury [are] well selected and as well calculated
to echo the sentiments of any Judge . . . .”); see also Juror Reform Bills of 1800, supra note 6, at
270 (“Concern about juror selection increased during the Sedition Act trials that were held between
1798 and 1800. Throughout those well-publicized proceedings, Republicans insisted that federal
marshals were packing juries to secure the conviction of men who had criticized the Adams
administration.” (footnote omitted)).
218. Thomas Jefferson, Petition to the General Assembly of Virginia (Nov. 2 or 3, 1798), in 30
THE P APERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 571, 572.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 573.
221. Id. Jefferson was tapping into a Republican fear that judges would overbear unwitting
jurors. See JOHN P HILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL
NEW HAMPSHIRE 115–30 (2004) (recounting an episode of heavy-handed judges in early
nineteenth-century New Hampshire).
222. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 17, 1798), in 17 THE P APERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 20, at 175, 175.
223. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
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extraordinarily bold position against federal power. The Constitution, he
explained, was a mere compact (“under the style & title of a Constitution”)
creating a government “for special purposes” with “certain definite
powers.” 224 Those powers included authority to recognize only a few
crimes—treason, counterfeiting, piracy, offenses against the law of nations—
and “no other crimes whatsoever.”225 Statutes creating any other crimes, he
admonished, were “altogether void and of no force.” 226
Jefferson then turned to speech and press freedoms. Under its
enumerated powers, and based on the Tenth Amendment, he explained,
Congress had “no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or
freedom of the press.”227 Instead, states retained “all lawful powers”
respecting those subjects, and each state retained “the right of judging how
far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without
lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be
separated from their use should be tolerated rather than the use be
destroyed.” 228 In other words, the implicit reservation of speech and press
freedoms under the Constitution meant not simply that the federal
government could not abridge rights to speaking, writing, and publishing, but
that it could not touch those subjects at all because doing so would require
defining the scope of those rights. Recall that Jefferson had already begun to
articulate this idea in response to the Cabell presentment.
After offering this account, Jefferson noted that “another & more special
provision”—the First Amendment—reinforced the same conclusion: that
“libels, falsehood and defamation equally with heresy & false religion are
witheld from the cognisance of federal tribunals.”229 The Kentucky
Resolutions thus defended an understanding of the First Amendment that
limited federal power without explaining how state protections for speech
and press freedoms might constrain state governments. 230 And, as with his
JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 529. The main text quotes from Jefferson’s draft, but his “fair copy”
is virtually identical. See Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Fair Copy (before Oct. 4, 1798), in 30 THE
PAPERS OF T HOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 543, 543–45. On the origins of the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, see generally Koch & Ammon, supra note 6.
224. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Draft (before Oct. 4, 1798), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 536, 536.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 536–37.
228. Id. at 537.
229. Id.
230. Jefferson, however, clearly indicated that states could “abridge[ ]” the “licentiousness of
speech and of the press.” Id. Indeed, although Kentucky’s 1799 Constitution provided that “every
citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject,” it recognized legal responsibility “for the
abuse of that liberty.” KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 7. It further provided for a truth defense in
“prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a
public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information.” Id., art. X, § 8.
These provisions were modeled on P A. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7.
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response to the Cabell presentment, Jefferson’s argument for exclusive state
authority over speech and the press also helped justify his radical state-based
remedy: a declaration by the Kentucky legislature that the Sedition Act “is
not law but is altogether void and of no force.” 231
In the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, by contrast, James Madison
provided a more nuanced account of the First Amendment. The Sedition Act,
Madison explained, exercised
a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary
expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto;
a power which more than any other ought to produce universal alarm,
because it is levelled against that right of freely examining public
characters and measures, and of free communication among the
people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual
guardian of every other right.232
The Sedition Act, he concluded, was a “palpable violation” of the rights that
the people had “declared and secured.”233 Although not entirely clear,
Madison seems to have been suggesting that an equivalent state sedition law
would also abridge the right of “free communication among the people.” 234
Just a few weeks later, however, the Virginia legislature issued an
“Address” that squarely returned to the Jeffersonian position. 235 “Every
libellous writing or expression,” the Assembly explained, “might receive its
punishment in the State courts, from juries summoned by an officer, who
does not receive his appointment from the President, and is under no
influence to court the pleasure of Government, whether it injured public
officers or private citizens.” 236 Yet again, Republicans explicitly adopted a
theory of speech and press freedoms grounded on a fear of corruptly chosen
federal juries.

231. Jefferson, supra note 224, at 537. In the Virginia legislature, John Taylor of Caroline
similarly tied the state-based remedy to the usurpation of state power. See Virginia Assembly
Debates (Dec. 20, 1798) (statement of Del. John Taylor of Caroline) (“[T]he States . . . as parties
[to the Constitution], were justifiable in preserving their rights under the compact against
violation.”), in DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 35, at 132–33.
232. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 20, at 185, 189–90.
233. Id. at 190.
234. Id.
235. The Address is often errantly attributed to James Madison. See David B. Mattern et al.,
Note on the Virginia Resolutions, 10 January 1799, and the Address of the General Assembly to the
People of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 23 January 1799 (addressing this misconception), in 17
THE P APERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 20, at 199, 199–206. The Address criticizes Federalist
reliance on the First Amendment as a source of federal power, but it does not articulate a theory of
speech and press freedoms that would inhibit sedition prosecutions.
236. Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Jan. 23,
1799), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: COMPRISING H IS P UBLIC P APERS AND H IS
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING N UMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE
FIRST T IME PRINTED 332, 334 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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IV. The Invention of First Amendment Federalism
A. Recasting History
Skepticism about the administration of laws abridging speech, rather
than opposition to the laws themselves, drove Republican thought. “If the
triers were formed of angelic materials . . . and blessed with a considerate
impartiality, that never was known to dwell in the hot flame of party spirit,”
a Virginia editorial opined, “this law might not then in its effects be a
destruction of any thing but the abuse and licentiousness of the press.”237 But
a federal marshal “would, no doubt, select those whom he should think good
jurors, and warm friends to his good order, when a question of good order
was upon the carpet.” 238 And juries therefore were “not so much a body of
inquest as instruments of conviction.”239 Republicans echoed these ideas over
and over throughout debates over the Sedition Act, portraying the Act as
giving the President dangerous authority to control the outcomes of cases in
which he and his party had an interest.
As they recast the First Amendment, Republicans may have realized that
the text of the First Amendment was largely unhelpful to their cause. Its
language, Federalists pointed out, had an established common law meaning
that was generally understood to permit sedition prosecutions.240 To counter
this persuasive textual argument, Republicans shifted their focus to a broader
historical narrative. Particularly noteworthy is the account in the Virginia
Report of 1800, authored by James Madison.
Madison’s historical reimagination began overseas. To understand the
“American idea” of the freedom of the press, he explained, it was useful to
start with “[t]he essential difference between the British government, and the
American constitutions.” 241 Under the British constitution, he wrote, “the
danger of encroachments on the rights of the people, is understood to be
confined to the executive magistrate,” and therefore “an exemption of the
press from previous restraint by licensers appointed by the king, is all the
freedom that can be secured to it.”242 (Madison was referring, at least in part,
to the English Bill of Rights, which imposed disabilities on the King but not
Parliament.243) But in the United States, Madison insisted, “the case is
altogether different. The people, not the government, possess the absolute
sovereignty.” 244 Thus, he concluded:

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

The Independent (Dec. 11, 1798), TIMES & ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1798.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 175–84 and accompanying text.
MADISON, supra note 20, at 336.
Id.
English Bill of Rights, supra note 136.
MADISON, supra note 20, at 336–37.
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This security of the freedom of the press, requires that it should be
exempt, not only from previous restraint by the executive, as in Great
Britain; but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be
effectual, must be an exemption, not only from the previous inspection
of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws. 245
In the English constitutional tradition, however, it was simply untrue
that customary constitutional rights restricted only executive power. Rather,
these rights routinely imposed limits on the rightful exercise of legislative
authority. The rule against ex post facto laws is an obvious example.
Parliamentary acts were generally unreviewable in court because of
Parliament’s legal supremacy, but most elites had long since come to the
view that sovereignty resided in the people themselves, and that Parliament
was constrained by the customary constitution even though its acts were
beyond judicial review. 246 Following this tradition, the American colonists
had fought a revolution to defend their rights as Englishmen—not to
transform the meaning of those rights. 247
Consequently, there was nothing peculiar about using English traditions
to define American liberties. 248 Americans “hav[e] derived all [their] rights,
from one common source, the British systems,” Federal Farmer
characteristically explained. 249 To be sure, not all of these rights were
enumerated in England’s foundational constitutional texts. As Madison had
explained in 1789,
whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or

245. Id. at 337.
246. PHILIP H AMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL D UTY 250–54 (2008); JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL H ISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 84–
86 (1991). On the development of popular sovereignty, see generally EDMUND S. MORGAN,
INVENTING THE PEOPLE: T HE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
247. For discussions of English rights and the American Revolution, see generally JACK P.
GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011) and REID, supra
note 32.
248. Indeed, when arguing for the protection of customary rights, Anti-Federalists often relied
on English authorities like Blackstone. E.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph
(Oct. 16, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 64, at 61, 62–63.
249. FEDERAL F ARMER, LETTER II TO THE REPUBLIC (1787), reprinted in 19 THE
DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE R ATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 214, 216;
see also, e.g., A PLEBEIAN, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE S TATE OF NEW YORK (1788)
(asserting that “it was useless to stipulate for the liberty of the press” in New York’s constitution,
“for the common and statute law of England, and the laws of the colony are established, in which
this privilege is fully defined and secured”), reprinted in 20 T HE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 942, 961. Interestingly, some Federalists
in the First Congress adopted the narrative of American exceptionalism when protesting a proposed
law that would have disabled federal officers from electioneering, with other representatives relying
on English precedents. Debates in the House of Representatives, Third Session (Jan. 21, 1791), in
14 DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE F IRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED S TATES OF
AMERICA, at 339, 339–42 (William Charles diGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995).
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liberty of conscience, come in question in [Parliament], the invasion
of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not
contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting
which the people of America are most alarmed.250
The First Amendment did not change the meaning of these rights by
transforming them into restraints on legislative power; speech and press
freedoms already imposed limits on legislative power. Rather, the American
innovation was to enumerate these rights. The history of the ratification
controversy offered no support to Madison’s declaration in the Virginia
Report that “[t]he state of the press, therefore, under the common law, can
not in this point of view, be the standard of its freedom, in the United
States.” 251 English press freedom did limit Parliamentary authority.
Even if Americans were to depart from Blackstone’s definition of press
freedom, however, Madison recognized that they would still need to
determine “the proper boundary between the liberty and licentiousness of the
press.” 252 But this difficulty was beside the point regarding federal
regulations of speech, Madison argued, because the First Amendment “was
meant as a positive denial to Congress, of any power whatever on the
subject.”253 Venturing beyond his Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Madison
now clearly adopted the standard Republican position. “To demonstrate that
this was the true object of the article,” he wrote, “it will be sufficient to recall
the circumstances which led to it, and to refer to the explanation
accompanying the article.” 254 Again, Madison was turning to history.
The absence of enumerated rights in the original Constitution, combined
with congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Madison
recalled, led to “great apprehensions” that “certain rights, and . . . the
freedom of the press particularly,” might be “drawn by construction within
some of the powers vested in Congress.”255 Federalists, he explained, had
urged that “the power over the rights in question, and particularly over the
press, was neither among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of

250. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). Madison went on to
say: “The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are
unguarded in the British Constitution.” Id. Assuming that the debate records are accurate, Madison
seems to have viewed “the British Constitution” as limited to constitutional documents like Magna
Carta and the English Bill of Rights. But the key point to recognize is that Madison clearly
appreciated in 1789 that English constitutionalism recognized certain “great rights”—like “freedom
of the press”—that operated against legislative as well as executive action. Thus, even if those
English rights were not explicitly solemnized in constitutional texts, their definition needed no
transformation when taken from England and applied in the United States.
251. MADISON, supra note 20, at 337.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 339.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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them.” 256 Thus, he concluded, “it would seem scarcely possible to doubt, that
no power whatever over the press, was supposed to be delegated by the
constitution, as it originally stood; and that the amendment was intended as
a positive and absolute reservation of it.” 257 In other words, the press was
“wholly exempt from the power of Congress.”258
Many scholars still defend the Republican view that the First
Amendment disabled the federal government from passing laws that touch
speech.259 This argument, in turn, bolsters the idea that free speech challenges
should be “facial,” focusing on the constitutionality of laws rather than the
facts of particular cases. Nicholas Rosenkranz, for instance, notes that
Thomas Jefferson’s analysis of the Sedition Act’s constitutional deficiency
“was ‘facial’ in the sense that he found the constitutional violation to be
evident on the face of the statute.” 260 Along similar lines, relying extensively
on Jefferson’s and Madison’s arguments against the Sedition Act, Kurt Lash
argues for a similar assessment of religious freedom because “the original
Free Exercise Clause . . . appears to be limited to a prohibition of laws that
abridge religion qua religion.” 261 Meanwhile, Will Baude uses the
Republican opposition to suggest that “regulation of the press is a great
power” that cannot be reached under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 262
Republicans, however, were making novel arguments against the
Sedition Act, offering a distorted view of the First Amendment’s origins. To
be sure, a few Federalists had argued that the federal government would lack

256. Id.
257. Id. at 340. Madison also used the rule against prior restraints to argue against legislative
interference with the press. In order to be effectual, he insisted, the “exemption” of the press from
“legislative restraint . . . must be an exemption, not only from the previous inspection of licensers,
but from the subsequent penalty of laws,” id. at 337, because “a law inflicting penalties on printed
publications, would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them,” id. at
336.
258. Id. at 340. A year earlier, prominent Virginia lawyer George Hay had offered a similar
account of the First Amendment’s origins. See HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE
LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 37–38 (Phila., Aurora Office 1799) (“If the word freedom was used in [a
natural-rights] sense, by the framers of the amendment, they meant to say, Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of the press, which freedom, however, is to be regulated by law. Folly
itself does not speak such language.”).
259. E.g., Lash, supra note 87, at 1111–14; Mayton, supra note 8, at 97, 119.
260. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209,
1236, 1271 (2010).
261. Lash, supra note 87, at 1113; see also Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious
Liberty: The Natural Rights and Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 369 (2016) (“The founders’ jurisdictional understanding of religious
liberty denies the idea of a constitutional right to religious exemptions.”). Lash later adopted the
Jeffersonian position full stop, arguing that prior to 1868 Congress had no authority to grant
religious exemptions even to its own laws. Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59
OHIO S T. L.J. 1069, 1099–1116 (1998).
262. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738,
1822 (2013).
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any authority to regulate the press under Article I.263 Most Federalist denials
of federal power to restrain the liberty of the press, however, were based on
the implied retention of rights, not a categorical lack of federal power.264 And
when Federalists had openly denied federal power over the liberty of the
press, they often clarified that they were simply disclaiming federal power to
initiate a licensing regime. 265
Most importantly, though, whatever their views on the extent of
congressional powers, nobody in the ratification debates suggested that
adding a guarantee of speech and press freedoms would reinforce an absence
of federal power over expression. If anything, they recognized that such an
enumeration would imply just the opposite. As Alexander Hamilton noted in
Federalist No. 84, for instance, a “provision against restraining the liberty of
the press” would “afford[] a clear implication that a power to prescribe proper
regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national
government.” 266
Like so much of constitutional debate in the 1790s, Madison made new
arguments in light of new circumstances. The Framers had not anticipated
the emergence of political parties, and the alignment of partisan interests
among the three branches—combined with the hand selection of federal
jurors in many states—created a toxic environment for political dissenters.
And, recognizing this development explicitly, Republicans justified their
interpretation of the First Amendment by invoking the axiom of natural law
that no man should decide his own case. “[W]hat security of a fair trial
remained to a citizen,” Albert Gallatin asked rhetorically, “when the jury was
liable to be packed by the Administration, when the same men were to be
judges and parties?” 267 To the extent that Founding Era constitutionalism
allowed appeals to social-contract theory and natural law to interpret
constitutional provisions, Republicans had a plausible case that the
emergence of political parties had transformed constitutional meaning.268

263.
264.
265.
266.

See Campbell, supra note 8, at 300 n.242 (collecting sources).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton); see also, e.g., THE
ADDRESS OF THE MINORITY IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE TO THE P EOPLE OF THAT S TATE;
CONTAINING A VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION L AWS 12
(1799) (“It would have been certainly unnecessary thus to have modified the legislative powers of
Congress concerning the press, if the power itself does not exist.”). Some have proposed that this
line of reasoning violates the constructive rule in the Ninth Amendment. E.g., Baude, supra note
262, at 1796–98. But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 659 n.3 (2012)
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (inferring power from the Fifth Amendment).
Madison’s original draft of the Ninth Amendment included a rule specifically barring a powersenlarging inference from the enumeration of rights, but this language did not survive in the House.
Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 632 (1956).
267. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2164 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
268. On the importance of social-contract theory and natural law in shaping constitutional
discourse at the Founding, see generally Campbell, supra note 26.
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Republicans, however, resolutely avoided casting their argument in
terms of constitutional change. Rather, “the best way of coming at the truth
of the construction of any part of the Constitution,” they insisted, was
“examining the opinions that were held respecting it when it was under
discussion in the different States.” 269 The position of Madison and his
colleagues, in other words, was constrained by a constitutional culture that
prized historical argument over openly acknowledged shifts in constitutional
meaning.270 History was, as it continues to be, a core feature of American
constitutionalism.
The fact that Republicans made new arguments in historical terms ought
to give us significant pause about modern reliance on post-ratification
statements as evidence of original meaning. Scholars of the Founding have
widely appreciated the remarkable diversity and fluidity of constitutional
argument,271 making it tricky to assess whether and how debates in the 1790s
reflected original meaning. What the history of the Republican opposition to
the Sedition Act adds to this challenge is recognition of a constitutional
culture where novel arguments were actually cast in historical terms by the
Founders themselves. None of this is to deny our capacity to produce
intellectual histories of Founding Era constitutional thought. But that task
certainly becomes harder after realizing that the Founders were originalists
and living constitutionalists at the very same time.
Drawing on their revised view of history, Republican opponents of the
Sedition Act had a profound influence on American constitutionalism.
Leading Virginia jurist Spencer Roane described Madison’s Report as “the
Magna Charta on which the republicans settled down, after the great struggle
in the year 1799.”272 For the next century, however, that legacy was defined
by a narrow understanding of federal power, with profound ramifications that
269. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151 (1798) (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Macon).
270. See GIENAPP, supra note 17 (exploring this concept); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of
American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 192–93, 197–213 (1997) (same); see, e.g.,
Virginia Assembly Debates (Dec. 13, 1798) (statement of Del. John Taylor of Caroline) (“He then
read the 3d article of the amendments to the constitution concerning freedom of speech &c. and
asked in what sense this clause was understood at the time of adoption?”), in DEBATES IN THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 35, at 7. To be sure, it is possible that Madison
fully believed what he was saying about history. But the 1798 Virginia Resolutions, which did not
articulate a jurisdictional view of the First Amendment, see supra notes 232–34 and accompanying
text, suggest that Madison was a latecomer to the dominant Republican position. For a discussion
of “Madison and the Origins of Originalism,” focusing on Madison’s constitutional arguments
earlier in the 1790s, see RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 339–65. Intriguingly, Madison’s later
invocations of the ratification debates may be inconsistent with his earlier views about using that
type of evidence in constitutional interpretation. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original
Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159, 165 (1996). For a probing discussion of the use of
history in English and American constitutionalism, see REID, supra note 16, at 28–40.
271. E.g., GIENAPP, supra note 17.
272. [Spencer Roane], Hampden I, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 11, 1819, reprinted in JOHN
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 113 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
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went well beyond debates about regulating expression. 273 Over time, some
thinkers proposed a broader conception of speech and press rights, but these
ideas gained very little traction among judges. As the Supreme Court
summarized in 1907, the “freedom of speech and freedom of the press . . . do
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary
to the public welfare.”274
B. Juries, Judges, and Expressive Freedom
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to
articulate far more robust free speech doctrines. And just as James Madison
had reimagined the First Amendment’s origins, the Justices reimagined the
Madisonian mythology. In its seminal decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan,275 the Court claimed that “the great controversy over the Sedition
Act . . . crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First
Amendment.”276 The Sedition Act was “never tested in this Court,” 277 Justice
Brennan wrote—failing to mention that seven federal judges (including four
of six Supreme Court Justices) had unanimously upheld its
constitutionality. 278 But “the attack upon its validity ha[d] carried the day in
the court of history,” he triumphantly proclaimed. 279
The only consensus Republican argument against the Sedition Act,
however, was that the federal government lacked any authority to regulate
expression. Incorporating that concept against state governments would have
been radical indeed, depriving state and federal authorities from
implementing all sorts of uncontroversial laws, like bans on defamation,
perjury, and fraud. And even Republican opponents of the Sedition Act had
widely acknowledged that public officials could bring libel suits “upon the
same footing with a private individual.”280
273. See Kevin R. Gutzman, A Troublesome Legacy: James Madison and “The Principles of
‘98”, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 569, 583–89 (1995) (examining this legacy); Kurt T. Lash, James
Madison’s Celebrated Report of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 165, 182–86 (2006) (same); H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay
in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 690–96 (1994) (same).
274. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). See generally
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997) (examining free speech
between 1870 and 1920).
275. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
276. Id. at 273.
277. Id. at 276.
278. BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 144–45.
279. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
280. TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND THE L IBERTY OF
THE PRESS 259 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1800); see also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the
Constitution of the United States (writing in 1803 that “the farmer, and the man in authority, stand
upon the same ground: both are equally entitled to redress for any false aspersion on their respective
characters, nor is there any thing in our laws or constitution which abridges this right”), in VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED S TATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 91, 237–38 (1999); cf.
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But rather than grapple with historical complexity, Justice Brennan and
his colleagues reinvented the First Amendment yet again. The freedom of
speech, the Court held, “prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice.’”281 Perhaps the Justices
were simply misinformed about history, but it seems more likely that their
decision—historical homages notwithstanding—was never really about
fidelity to original meaning. 282
The many causes of developments in speech doctrine ever since are well
beyond the scope of this Article, but one point is worth highlighting: the
Supreme Court regularly announced speech-protective doctrines designed to
shield speakers from the whims of biased or ignorant juries. 283 As Justice
Harlan explained, “[I]n many areas which are at the center of public debate
‘truth’ is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to the pre-existing
prejudices of a jury the determination of what is ‘true’ may effectively
institute a system of censorship.” 284 With a brooding tone, he continued:
“Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heritage cannot so
readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity.” 285
Distrust of state judges and juries—particularly in cases coming out of
the South—was commonplace in twentieth-century civil rights decisions.286
JOHN T HOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE L IBERTY, AND L ICENTIOUSNESS OF THE PRESS,
AND THE UNCONTROULABLE N ATURE OF THE H UMAN MIND : CONTAINING AN INVESTIGATION OF
THE R IGHT W HICH GOVERNMENT H AVE TO CONTROUL THE FREE EXPRESSION OF PUBLIC
OPINION, ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF THE U. STATES 81–84 (N.Y.C., Johnson & Stryker 1801)
(calling for unimpeded public debate about public figures, although seemingly not interpreting the
First Amendment at this point of the argument).
281. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
282. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
782, 790 (1986) (suggesting that the Court was motivated to “save the Times” from a “deep
miscarriage of the common law process”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156 (1998) (“Fidelity to history wasn’t
the goal of the doctrinal innovations of the 1960’s; adapting the law to immediate social needs
was.”).
283. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (“A negligence test [for defamation]
would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the
reasonableness of steps taken by it . . . .”).
284. Id. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
285. Id.; see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] jury determination, unpredictable in the most neutral circumstances, becomes for
those who venture to discuss heated issues, a virtual roll of the dice separating them from liability
for often massive claims of damage.”); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971)
(“A standard of ‘relevance,’ . . . applied by a jury under the preponderance-of-the-evidence test, is
unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech . . . .”); Hill, 385 U.S. at 402 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (highlighting the “capricious or whimsical circumstances” and “emotions and
prejudices” that often guide a jury); see also AMAR, BILL OF R IGHTS, supra note 10, at 24 (“As the
First Amendment’s center of gravity has (appropriately, in light of the later Fourteenth Amendment)
shifted to protection of unpopular, minority speech, its natural institutional guardian has become an
insulated judiciary rather than the popular jury.”).
286. See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 282, at 1153 (“The need that gave birth to the
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Speech cases were no exception. The Court recognized the “freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas” in a famous
1958 decision overturning an Alabama court’s onerous (and legally
meritless) discovery order and contempt judgment against the nation’s
leading civil rights group.287 Just six years later, New York Times v. Sullivan
involved an Alabama jury’s onerous (and legally meritless) damages award
to a local official based on a civil rights advertisement. 288 As it expanded
doctrinal categories in order to limit abridgments of speech, the Court also
ensured that it (and other courts) could review the factual bases of earlier
decisions.289 Recent cases occasionally reflect similar concerns. 290 For better
or worse, an amendment designed in part to empower juries now stands
firmly as a bulwark against their prejudices.
More broadly, the Court’s mid-century speech and press decisions were
part of an effort to elevate judicial scrutiny in those instances where the
justices had less reason to trust the good faith of governmental officials. 291
The Court’s first significant doctrinal expansion under the First Amendment,
for instance, came in Near v. Minnesota,292 which curtailed the power of trial
judges to insulate themselves from criticism using contempt sanctions. 293
Other cases cut back on the ability of political officials to limit speech
through discretionary licensing schemes, 294 with the Justices occasionally
signaling broader concerns of political entrenchment. 295 The Supreme

existing criminal procedure regime was institutionalized racism. . . . Modern criminal procedure
reflects the Supreme Court’s admirable contribution to eradicating this incidence of American
apartheid.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1388–89 (2004)
(making a similar point); see also Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 61–67, 79–82 (2000) (giving particular attention to the issue of
black jury service).
287. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
288. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–65 (1964).
289. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984).
290. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (concluding that a jury would be
“unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech” (alteration in original) (quoting
Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510)).
291. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (laying out the
framework for heightened scrutiny). For a provocative discussion of Carolene Products and its
relationship to speech doctrine, see G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The
Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 327–42 (1996).
292. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
293. Id. at 712–15.
294. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559–62 (1948) (striking down discretionary
licenses for loudspeakers); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (striking
down discretionary licenses for speech in streets and parks); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
451–52 (1938) (striking down discretionary licenses for leafleting).
295. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE
L.J. 400, 416–18 (2015).
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Court’s earliest First Amendment decisions thus seem to align with a
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review. 296
But while concerns about self-interested legislation and biased
enforcement were often at play in these early cases, the Justices rarely relied
on those concerns explicitly. And First Amendment law soon took a different
turn. Judicial decisions and scholarly commentaries are now dominated by
various substantive theories of expressive freedom, all of which seek to
explain why speech and the press are deserving of special protection. 297 The
First Amendment, many argue, exists to protect democratic selfgovernment.298 Others point to its role in promoting a marketplace of ideas,
“further[ing] the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information.”299 Still more insist that free speech is essential to “individual
self-realization.”300
None of these theories were baked into the First Amendment, which
originally allowed the government to regulate harmful speech in promotion
of the public good.301 Nor does the Republican invention of First Amendment
federalism offer a theoretical justification for treating speech as special. But
for those inclined to reorient First Amendment doctrine in a more historically
grounded direction, the response to the Sedition Act could still prove
relevant. Republicans made strained arguments, to be sure, but their core
insight endures: political entrenchment and politically biased enforcement
are a clear danger to republican government. Perhaps it is time to bring that
concern back to the doctrinal fore. 302

296. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747, 754–55 (1991).
297. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 22, at 1785–86 (reviewing some of these theories).
298. E.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
299. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–62
(1980).
300. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
301. Campbell, supra note 8, at 313.
302. For scholarly suggestions along these lines, see Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 631–48; Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502 (1997); Klarman, supra note
296, at 753–57; Levinson & Sachs, supra note 295, at 402. Of course, translating general concerns
about biased decisions into specific doctrinal rules would often be tricky. See, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2012) (discussing
competing ways that a process-based theory of judicial review might apply in the context of
campaign-finance cases).

